









Title of Thesis: MEMORY AND RECONCILIATION IN THE 
SPANISH TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY:   
1975-1982 
  
 Sebastian Eduardo Carias, Master of Arts, 2017 
  
Thesis Directed By: Dr. Jeffery C. Herf, History Department 
 
 
 This thesis examines the Spanish transition to democracy from 1975 to 1982. It is 
an analysis of important political leaders of Spain and important political parties. The 
research questions are why after the death of the dictator Francisco Franco’s did Spain 
become a constitutional monarchy? How did the political leaders work together towards a 
consensus to democratic transition without causing another civil war? I analyze three 
things: political amnesty of prisoners and exiles, the creation and ratification of the 1978 
Constitution, and the rise and success of the Spanish Socialist Party. Ultimately, the 












MEMORY AND RECONCILIATION IN THE SPANISH TRANSITION TO  




     





Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
  University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment 
     of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts,  


















Professor Jeffery C. Herf, Chair 
Professor Alejandro Cañeque 
































© Copyright by 












Table of Contents 
 
 
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... ii 
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................... iii 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1: Beginning of the Transition and the Question on Amnesty and Legalization  
of Political Parties (1975-1977) .................................................................................. 17 
Chapter 2: The 1978 Constitution, Consensus, and the Push for Regional Autonomy: 
1977-1978 ................................................................................................................... 53 
Chapter 3: The Rise and Victory of the Spanish Socialist Party: 1979-1982 ............. 81 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 111 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 121 
 













List of Abbreviations 
 
AP:   Alianza Popular or Popular Alliance 
 
CCOO Comisiones Obreras or the Workers Commission partnered with the 
Communist Party 
 
CEOE Confederacion Española de Organizaciones Empresariales or Spanish 
Confederation of Business Organizations 
 
ETA:   Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna or Basque Homeland and Freedom 
 
GRAPO:  Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre or Antifascist 
Resistance Groups First of October 
 
PCE:   Partido Comunista de España or The Spanish Communist Party 
 
PNV:   The Basque Nationalist Party 
 
PSOE:  Partido Socialista Obrero Español or The Spanish Socialist Party 
 
UCD:   Unión de Centro Democrático or the Democratic Center Party 
 
UGT Unión General de Trabajadores or the General Union of Workers 


















This thesis examines the history of the Spanish transition to democracy that began 
on November 20, 1975 after the death of Francisco Franco and ended with the 1982 
elections. It describes the history of compromise that made possible the transition away 
from authoritarian rule without major political turmoil. The Franco dictatorship existed 
for 39 years from 1936 until his death in 1975. The political leaders of the democratic left 
and right sought a consensus over the tragic past of Spain dating back to the Spanish 
Civil War (1936-39). They following pages describe the key decisions made by political 
leaders during the Spanish transition. 
 In its history, Spain has had failed attempts of a democracy. This transition 
succeeded because political leaders understood the past and learned from the 1930s when 
the Second Republic existed (1931-36). While the transition was not completely peaceful, 
the Spanish leaders on the left and the right were able to negotiate over freedom, political 
amnesty, and the 1978 Constitution. During the first years of the transition, Spain went 
through long and difficult negotiations over political amnesty of political prisoners and 
the 1978 Constitution. However, the democratic transition would not have been as 
successful as it was without the decisions made by King Juan Carlos, the resignation of 
Carlos Arias Navarro (Franco’s last Prime Minister), and the leadership of Adolfo Suárez 
as a reformer. Suárez became prime minister1 with support from the King on July 3, 1977 
                                                          
1 In Spanish, the word used in my Spanish sources and translations is presidente (president). 





until he resigned on January 29, 1981. The transition’s first three years had major success 
in transforming Spain into a democracy. Since Franco’s death, it took almost 3 years for 
Spain to have its first democratic elections in June 1977 and to approve a new 
constitution in December 1978.2 Suárez and other leaders of the new UCD party (the 
Democratic Center Party), needed to include all parties on both sides for the transition to 
succeed. Despite the violence from ETA (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna or Basque Homeland 
and Freedom), GRAPO3 and a failed coup d’état in 1981, the Spanish transition 
succeeded. 
The sharp divide amongst Spaniards inside and outside Spain showcased the 
difficulties of the transitional period to democracy. The responses made by the left and 
the right provided historians and political scientists’ key analytical questions. How did 
Spaniards after Franco’s death lead to a consensus amongst the political leaders on both 
sides? Why did men such as Adolfo Suárez and King Juan Carlos support amnesty? Why 
did they reinstate the opposition political parties such as the PSOE (the Spanish Socialist 
Party) and the PCE (the Spanish Communist Party)? How did Spanish leaders become 
influenced by the memories of the Second Republic and the Spanish Civil War during the 
transition? What is the Spanish model and how did that model successfully push forward 
peaceful democratic elections and lead to the rebirth and success of the PSOE in 1982? 
Lastly, what were the consequences of the transition to democracy in Spain? 
                                                          
2 Pamela Beth Radcliff, Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and Popular Origins 
of the Transition, 1960-78 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 1. 
3 ETA is a Basque terrorist organization. GRAPO stands for Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista 






The evidence on which this thesis rests includes the following sources: the Cortes 
(Spanish parliament) records post 1977, newspapers, magazines, and publications by 
party leaders. These newspapers and magazines include: El País, ABC, El Socialista (the 
Socialist Party newspaper), Mundo Obrero (the Communist Party newspaper), the New 
York Times, Diario 16, and Ya (a Catholic newspaper published in Spain). Furthermore, I 
analyze the reports from the United States embassy in Madrid to the U.S. State 
Department during the President Gerald Ford and the Jimmy Carter Administrations. 
While this thesis is about events in Spain and Spanish political leaders, the U.S. Embassy 
in Madrid had reports of significant during the transition. The U.S. State Department 
Central Files from the National Archives provides diplomatic statements and concerns 
over the amnesty debates in 1976 and 1977, specifically about the legalization of the 
Communist Party. While American diplomatic sources focused on Spain and NATO, 
these documents have vital information on the Spanish transition. One of the significant 
aspects of this thesis is the emergence of the free press after Franco’s death. Magazines 
such as Cuadernos para el Diálogo (Notebooks for Dialogue) and Cambio 16 (Change 
16) became more comfortable writing critically about the Franco regime. El País was 
born after Franco’s death and became a significant source during the transition. These 
sources are central for the study of Modern Spanish history. 
The Constitutional debates in the Spanish parliament contained leaders of the 
major political parties, except for the Basques, and their arguments about the creation of 
the Spanish Constitution. These debates have speeches from each major party of Spain 
during the parliamentary debates in the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. These 





these politicians compromised. Leaders of the Socialist Party wrote a significant amount 
of publications from 1975 to 1982 about the goals of the party and the debates about 
Marxism in a post-Franco Spain. For example, Felipe González was the Secretary 
General of the Spanish Socialist Party. In an essay, González wrote, “How was this 
unusual transition possible? To the personal and authoritarian regime there has been a 
monarchy that tries to institutionally connect to the demands of freedom and democracy 
of the people, facilitating in the political superstructure the precise adjustments demanded 
by broad popular sectors.”4 The monarchy was King Juan Carlos and he proved to 
support the people’s demands for democracy.  
In Chapter One, I examine political reform and political amnesty of prisoners and 
exiles before and during the presidency of Adolfo Suárez, specifically the restoration of 
the PSOE and the PCE in Spain as official political parties. Under Suárez’s leadership, 
the Law for Political Reform of 1976 and the Amnesty Law of 1977 passed, which 
allowed opposition parties to reengage in political activity. However, it was through 
political amnesty that the memory of the war and Francoism pacified Franco’s former 
opponents. Suárez’s leadership led to the successful negotiations of the Moncloa Pacts,5 
amnesty, and the elections of 1977. In Chapter Two, I describe the history and political 
discussions of the Spanish Constitution of 1978. A key question of this chapter is why did 
decentralization and regional autonomy become a major factor on the drafting of the 
1978 Constitution? Political leaders of the major parties, minus the Basques, played a 
role in the drafting and successful ratification of the 1978 Constitution. Furthermore, both 
                                                          
4 Felipe González, España y su futuro (Madrid: Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1978), p. 25. 
5 The Moncloa Pacts was a political compromise over the Spanish economy led by Adolfo Suárez 





the press and the politicians brought up the comparisons to the memory of the failures 
and tragedies of the Second Republic. Chapter Three analyzes the consolidation of the 
Constitutional Monarchy and the rise of the Socialist Party from 1979 to 1982. In this 
chapter I analyze internal debates within the Socialist Party over the term Marxism. The 
PSOE’s victory in 1982 represented the progress made in a democratic Spain. I conclude 
with a reevaluation of the significance of this transition and how the American diplomatic 
sources provide key evidence to Modern Spanish history.  
The Spanish Model 
 Historians and political scientists analyzed the Spanish model as an achievement 
in what the American political scientist Samuel Huntington calls “the third wave of 
democratization.”6 In this period of the late twentieth century, Huntington lists the 
beginning of the third wave in Southern Europe which specifically included Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain.7 This wave would later include Latin America, East Asia and 
Eastern Europe during the collapse of Communism.8 Thus, Spain became the blueprint 
that took a different path towards democracy. For example, the political scientist Richard 
Gunther argued, “Spain’s transition to democracy is widely regarded as having been 
extremely successful. In a country completely lacking a tradition of stable democratic 
governance, it culminated in the establishment of a consolidated democracy that has 
taken its place within the mainstream of Western democratic systems.”9 The Second 
                                                          
6 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman 
and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 21.  
7 Ibid., p. 21-22. 
8 Ibid., p. 21-26. 
9 Richard Gunther, “The Spanish Model Revisited,” ed. Gregorio Alonso and Diego Muro, The 
Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition: the Spanish Model (New York: Routledge Taylor and 





Republic only lasted from 1931 to 1936 before the Spanish Civil War but the transition 
proved that Spain could create a democratic state.  
Gunther specified that this model is also known as the “pacted” transition.10 Part 
of the praise of this model were Spain’s unique circumstances in the 1970s. Franco had 
been dictator for almost forty years and the state had eased up on restrictions starting in 
the 1960s. For example, Pío Moa, a historian, argued, “After 1959, the regime changed 
its political economy by liberalizing it. Franco, reluctant at first, accepted advice from his 
experts, with spectacular results.”11 Franco listened to his advisors and reformed the 
Spanish economy. The historian Nigel Townson argues the significance of the Late 
Franco era in the 1960s and 70s and that the period before the transition had the start of 
socio-economic and cultural changes in Spain.12 The foundations of the transition began 
with small but significant changes in Spain. 
King Juan Carlos’s actions had significance in the transition to democracy. Juan 
Linz and Alfred Stepan claimed that Spain was unique because of Franco’s decision to 
install a monarchy and that the King was the pilot of change in Spain once Franco died.13 
The King became a unique head of state as the successor of an authoritarian dictator. 
Furthermore, Gunther added, “The king earned his reputation as el piloto del cambio…by 
dismissing the reactionary Arias Navarro as prime minister and replacing him with 
Adolfo Suárez in July 1976, thereby setting in motion the democratization process.”14 
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
11 Pío Moa, Los mitos de la Guerra Civil (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, S.L., 2003), p. 520. 
12 Nigel Townson, “Introduction,” in Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959-75, 
ed. Nigel Townson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p.2 
13 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: John’s Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), p.89. 





The Spanish model had assistance by Franco’s heir because the King did not continue the 
authoritarian nature of the Francoist regime.    
The political scientist Jonathan Hopkin had an alternate view on the Spanish 
model’s success and legacy within Spain. He stated that, “Despite the predominant role 
played by negotiation and consensus in the process of regime change, by the early 1980s 
the new political system had developed the key characteristics of a majoritarian 
democracy.”15 Hopkin analyzed the significance of pacts amongst political leaders for the 
success of the Spanish transition.16 The Spanish transition was a competitive battle 
between the UCD, PSOE, and the PCE. Nevertheless, the Spanish model’s strategy for a 
democratic ending has had praise from many historians and political scientists as the 
solution to the multiple divisions in Spain.  
Debates over Franco’s Legacy 
Franco died on November 20, 1975 and the following day his funeral brought 
about divided opinions on his legacy by the press. The Spanish conservative and 
monarchist newspaper ABC17 covered the life and death of Franco on the day after he 
died.18 In the article, the Spanish conservative writer and politician Gonzalo Fernández de 
la Mora argued, “…Franco was the most important head of state Spain ever had...He 
                                                          
15 Jonathan Hopkin, “From Consensus to Competition: The Changing Nature of Democracy in the 
Spanish Transition,” in The Politics of Contemporary Spain, ed., Sebastian Balfour (New York: Routledge 
Taylor and Francis Group, 2005), p. 6. 
16 Hopkin, “From Consensus to Competition: The Changing Nature of Democracy in the Spanish 
Transition,” p. 7. 
17 In his “Index of Periodicals” from his work, The Autobiography of Federico Sanchez, Jorge 
Semprum labeled ABC as the newspaper of the “extreme monarchist right.” Today it is the Spanish 
conservative newspaper that is one of the most popular newspapers in Spain. Jorge Semprum, The 
Autobiography of Federico Sanchez and the Communist Underground in Spain, trans. Helen R. Lane (New 
York: Karz Publishers, 1979), p. 269. 
18 Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, “Franco,” ABC, November 21, 1975, p. 3, 






received an impoverished and invertebrate country and he converted it into a grand 
potential industry and a kingdom that is institutionally robust. He received a nation with 
an immense majority proletariat and he then transformed it into middle class societies.”19 
Franco’s legacy was of a dictator that modernized Spain and was an important figure in 
Spanish history.  
 Concomitantly, the clandestine newspaper for the exiled PSOE, El Socialista (The 
Socialist), challenged the right’s attempt to downplay Franco’s atrocities during and after 
the Spanish Civil War.  The editors of El Socialista denounced Franco’s legacy. They 
stated that even after Franco’s death, the dictatorship was still alive due to the 
authoritative legacy he left but history would judge Franco as guilty for war crimes.20 El 
Socialista were correct about the structure of the government. Franco’s successor, Prince 
Juan Carlos21 and his prime minister, Arias Navarro, were still in power. This concerned 
the Spanish left in whether Spain could ever achieve democracy in their homeland. 
What is the legacy of Francoism and why is it important in the Spanish transition 
to democracy? Franco was dictator of Spain for nearly 40 years and left a Fascist legacy 
from his ultra nationalist control over the country. This legacy left an impact during the 
transitional period from the “bunker,” the Spanish extreme Nationalists and the ultra-
Francoist supporters during and after his death.22 Linz wrote Totalitarian and 
Authoritarian Regimes in 1975 that analyzed multiple dictatorships in the twentieth 
                                                          
19 Ibid., p. 3. 
20 El Socialista, November 19, 1975, Library of Congress, Microfilm, Spain, Madrid, 1971-1976, 
Reel No. 2186. 
21 King Juan Carlos’s coronation was on November 22, 1975 when he officially became king. 
22 The bunker were political figures that wanted to continue Francoism and Falangism. It is based 
on a comparison to Adolf Hitler’s defeat in WWII when he and his cabinet hid a bunker under Berlin, 
quoted in: Paul Preston, The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution, and Revenge, Revised and Expanded 





century.23 In an updated version, he responded to his critics about his labeling of the 
Franco regime as authoritarian and not totalitarian. He argued, “I would never deny the 
totalitarian ambitions of the Spanish Falange and the totalitarian tendencies of the Franco 
regime during the hegemony of the Axis powers in Europe. I would…stress the legacy of 
limited pluralism in the origin of the regime, which Franco subordinated to his personal 
power and designs.”24 Linz agreed with some historians such as Javier Tusell, Stanley 
Payne, and Francois Furet on the distinctions between a totalitarian and an authoritarian 
state.25 Critics challenged Linz’s because the use of the term limited pluralism gave some 
democratic legitimacy to the Franco regime.26 Linz’s arguments with his critics 
showcased the sharp divisions over Franco’s legacy and how newspapers and politicians 
of the transition had their own ideas of Francoism. 
 How fascist was Francoism? According to Stanley Payne, Falangism did not have 
that same lasting power under Franco. José Antonio Primo de Rivera founded Falangism 
and not Franco. Therefore, did Falangism have a lasting impact in Spain during the later 
years of the regime? Payne concluded that, “Falangism lived on as no more than an 
ambiguous residue…the Movement had lost its cultural and social basis long before the 
physical death of Franco.”27 Payne’s argument as well as some historians of the later 
                                                          
23 According to the copyright page on page iv, Linz’s first six chapters of Totalitarian and 
Authoritarian Regimes appeared first n the Handbook of Political Science, Volume 3, Macropolitical 
theory, edited by Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975, in 
Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000), 
p. iv. 
24 Ibid., 3-4. 
25 Ibid., p. 4-5. 
26 Nigel Townson, “Introduction,” in Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959-75, 
ed. Nigel Townson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p.5. 
27 Stanley G. Payne, Fascism in Spain: 1923-1977 (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin 





Franco era point out the shift of Franco’s repression once some mild reforms began to 
take place in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Furthermore, Radcliff, who challenged Linz’s analysis of the Franco regime, its 
legacy, and Linz’s definition of authoritarianism, argued that, “Linz definition seems to 
downplay both the brutal repression and the fascist trappings of the regimes origins, 
especially in the Cold War context in which authoritarianism was being re-classified as 
the good form of dictatorship in the war against Soviet totalitarianism.”28 These debates 
by social scientists and historians brought forth arguments that Spaniards after the 
transition to democracy continue to debate. Nonetheless, Franco’s impact on the memory 
of the Spanish Civil War and during the transition showcased his immortality that divided 
Spaniards. Thus, the leaders of the transition had to absorb the animosity between the two 
sides (The anti-Francoists and the Nationalists) and to forget the violence and repression 
of the dictatorship to facilitate compromise for all parties. The memory of the past spilled 
out years after the transition with new analysis from critics about amnesia29 and 
collective memory in Spain. 
Pacto de Olvido30 and Spanish Historical and Collective Memory 
 Nigel Townson wrote about the Spanish transition to democracy’s impact in 
Spain’s current thoughts about the past. He claimed that the violent crimes during the 
1930s and 1940s “...were never addressed in political terms as a result of the overriding 
                                                          
28 Juan Linz, “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain”, in Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party systems, ed. 
E. Allardt and Y. Littunen (Helsinki: Turko, 1964) and Michael Mann, Fascists (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), p. 44, quoted in: Radcliff, p. 5. 
29 The political scientist Paloma Aguilar in 1996 wrote extensively about amnesia in Spain during 
the Transition, in Paloma Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the 
Transition to Democracy, trans. by Mark Oakley (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008). 
30 Carsten Humlebæk, “The “Pacto de Olvido,” in The Politics and Memory of Democratic 





quest for consensus…”31 One of the controversies surrounded by the democratic 
transition was the nonexistence of truth commissions. Furthermore, the change in 
government was a change from above led by reformers. Some of these reformers were 
once members of the Franco regime. Scholars such as Carsten Humlebæk and Paloma 
Aguilar labeled the transition and the Spanish model as La pacta de olvido or the pact of 
forgetting. It was a contract that the Spanish political leaders agreed to avoid the tragedy 
of the Spanish Civil War and Franco’s crimes.    
This pact became a major theme of the Spanish transition to democracy because 
of the lack of trials over past crimes. The historian Michael Richards said it best when he 
wrote, “The political ‘pact of forgetting’ has come to be understood as a much broader 
‘pact of silence’ than was really the case during the transitional process…”32 Richards, as 
well as other scholars of Modern Spain, understood that the pact of forgetting had to 
happen in the creation of the 1978 Constitution. Regional autonomy in areas such as 
Catalonia had major significance in the pact of forgetting because of the animosity 
between the provinces and the central government in Madrid.  
 In addition, the Spanish sociologist Salvador Cardús analyzed the role of memory 
during the transition in Spain. Cardús listed several points about the “erasure of 
memory”33 during the transition. He claimed that had the transition to democracy 
included a retaliation against the dictatorship, the old divisions from the Civil War would 
resurface and that the uncertainty of the actors involved avoided a need to instigate the 
                                                          
31 Nigel Townson, “Introduction,” in Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959-75, 
p. 8. 
32 Michael Richards, After the Civil War: Making Memory and Re-making Spain since 1936 (New 
York and Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 279. 
33 Salvador Cardús i Ros, “Politics and the Invention of Memory. For a Sociology of the 
Transition to Democracy in Spain,” in Dismembering the Dictatorship: The Politics of Memory in the 





“rattling of swords” without the democratic institutions.34 Furthermore, the King 
represented a symbol of “renovation and of political continuity” and that the institutions 
and apparatuses of the state and bureaucrats of the Franco era continued as part of the 
pact of forgetting.35 These points are part of Paul Preston’s conclusion in Triumph of 
Democracy that, “…Suárez had done the impossible in overseeing the legal transition 
from Francoist ‘legality’ to democracy. Thereafter, all the democratic parties had worked 
together to create the framework of the Constitution and the structures of regional 
autonomy.”36 Suárez, once a member of the Franco regime, led the task in handling a 
divided nation over the construction of a democratic system. 
Humlebæk, an expert in Spanish cultural studies, wrote about the pacto de olvido. 
He states that Franco’s victory against the Republicans in 1939 led to repression that 
divided during and after the post war years and that these issues of memory proved to be 
a dilemma for the construction of democracy.37 The role of memory did not disappear 
during the transition but the political leaders from the UCD, PSOE, and others chose to 
reconcile. Other common arguments on memory challenged the old myths concocted by 
the Franco regime. Julián Casanova’s article, “History and Memory: A New Social 
Dimension,” focused on the importance of historians that challenged the outdated 
narratives and myths of the Nationalists and supporters of Franco.38 The Nationalists won 
the war and had control over the narrative of the Spanish Civil War.  
                                                          
34 Ibid., p. 20. 
35 Ibid., p. 20-21. 
36 Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (New York: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1986), p. 
226. 
37 Carsten Humlebæk, “The “Pacto de Olvido,” in The Politics and Memory of Democratic 
Transition: the Spanish Model, p. 184. 
38 Julián Casanova, “History and Memory: A New Social Division,” 2008, International Journal 





Furthermore, in Soledad Fox’s article “Violence and Silence: The Repressed 
History of the Franco Regime,” the legacy of the Spanish Civil War and the official 
version by the Francoists hindered the discourses of the war that challenged the official 
version.39 The repression of the past by the Francoists disrupted any fair debates between 
the opposing sides. During the transition, Fox argued, “After Franco’s death, the process 
of reconciliation…was defined in terms of forgetting and silence. Taking De la Cierva’s 
cue, the transition to democracy presented itself as a forward-looking process and thus 
thwarted efforts to understand, let alone come to terms with, the past.”40 Silence now 
became the question as to whether this model of democratic transition would cause 
problems in the twenty-first century such as mass graves excavated.41 Fox criticized the 
historian Pío Moa and others about returning to the tragedies of the past due to the 
rediscovered mass graves.42 The debates about reinvestigating the past led to discourse 
and debate about Spanish history from 1931 to the present. 
                                                          
39 Soledad Fox, “Violence and Silence: The Repressed History of the Franco Regime,” in 
Unearthing Franco's Legacy: Mass Graves and the Recovery of Historical Memory in Spain, ed. Carlos 
Jerez-Farran and Samuel Amago, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), p. 39. 
               40 Ricardo De La Cierva was a Spanish historian and politician who wrote works such as 
Episodios Históricos de España de Ricardo De La Cierva: El PSOE De Felipe González, Adiós al 
Marxismo. Fox, “Violence and Silence: The Repressed History of the Franco Regime,” in Unearthing 
Franco's Legacy: Mass Graves and the Recovery of Historical Memory in Spain, p. 40.  
41 Mass graves were rediscovered in 2000 in such as in Priaranza del Bierzo in León, Spain, a 
town and province North of Madrid. The argument over memory and the rediscovered mass graves have 
led to several scholars analyzing the legacy and violence of the Spanish Civil War and the Franco regime. 
Examples of this scholarly debate can be found in Michael Richards, After the Civil War: Making Memory 
and Re-making Spain since 1936 (New York and Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 
330, and Michael Richards, “Grand Narratives, Collective Memory, and Social History: Public Uses of the 
Past in Post-War Spain,” in Unearthing Franco's Legacy: Mass Graves and the Recovery of Historical 
Memory in Spain, p. 136. See also, Helen Graham, The War and its Shadow: Spain’s Civil War in Europe’s 
Long Twentieth Century (Portland OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), p.127, and Ángela Cenarro, 
“Francoist Nostalgia and Memories of the Spanish Civil War,” 2008, International Journal of Iberian 
Studies, 21 no.3, 203-218, p. 203 and 205. 
42 Soledad Fox, “Violence and Silence: The Repressed History of the Franco Regime,” in 





Stanley Payne evaluated the topic of the Spanish transition to democracy. In his 
chapter, “Controversies over History in Contemporary Spain,” Payne gave his thoughts 
on contemporary topics of Spanish history and how the Civil War and Franco are one 
important trend in the field.43 He states, “The Spanish Transition presented the first 
example of a democratization from the inside out, in which the laws and institutions of 
the authoritarian regime were used to carry out a complete transformation into a 
democracy.”44 Thus, the leaders of the transition did not want a ruptura democrática 
(democratic rupture)45 that brought about overwhelming change in the political system. 
Payne spent the rest of the chapter chastising the left and the right on the myths about 
Franco and the Second Republic and that surviving Francoists have continued to promote 
Franco as a national hero.46 However, these subjects of memory and the past legacies of 
Franco and the Second Republic did not overly distract the transition from the success of 
the Constitution of 1978. Certainly, the press brought up these topics during the 
anniversaries of momentous events such as the start of the Spanish Civil War, and the end 
of the war.47  
Lastly, the Spanish journalist Gregorio Morán challenged the Spanish model’s 
praise since the price of the transition was too heavy. Morán’s argument was an analysis 
of the transition fifteen years later since Franco’s death. On the Spanish model, he argues, 
“The pedagogical function of the democratic victory over the dictatorship is obscured, 
                                                          
43 Stanley G. Payne, Spain: A New History (Madison Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2011), p. 245, http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/chapter/51124 (accessed December 30, 
2016). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpura, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy (London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1979), p. 209. 
46 Stanley G. Payne, Spain: A New History, p. 249. 
47 Paloma Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to 





when not hidden, by the fact that the transition must be focused as a defeat. A defeat of 
everything that was for many anti-Francoists objectives as an unavoidable future: 
freedom without oligarchies that limit it, and the social and political transformations as an 
open activity for the citizen.”48 Morán portrayed the Spanish transition through a 
pessimistic lens from the left. The oligarchs he referred to were Franco’s supporters or 
members of Franco’s regime that played a role in the Spanish transition. This dilemma 
would come into fruition once the twenty-first century opened investigations of suspects 
that committed crimes against the supporters of the Second Republic. 
To add to Morán’s criticism of the transition, Alison Ribeiro de Menezes analyzed the 
transition, the memory debates, and argued that the pacto de olvido in the 1970s, “…has 
been cited as evidence of the limitations of Spanish democracy, which is found wanting 
precisely in its attitude toward those who suffered at the hands of the Nationalists during 
the Civil War and the Franco Regime.”49 The criticisms towards the Spanish transition 
derived from the lack of justice against those involved in the Franco regime and the 
crimes committed by the Nationalist forces. Critics were right because no truth 
commissions happened during the transition against the military nor the Franco loyalists 
in politics. 
Nevertheless, the Spanish transition to democracy was an achievement and period 
of political compromise and reconciliation. Still, the consequences included the lack of 
justice against Nationalists and their atrocities during and after the Spanish Civil War. 
Furthermore, the rise of ETA and their attacks during the transition showed that these old 
                                                          
48 Gregorio Morán, El precio de la transcición (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, S.A., 1992), p. 31. 
49 Alison Ribeiro de Menezes, Embodying Memory in Contemporary Spain (New York: Palgrave 





wounds would not die so easily. However, through the leadership of men such as Adolfo 
Suárez and Felipe González, the Spanish model succeeded in moving on from conflict as 
leaders from each political party sought for an improved future in Spain. This includes: 
amnesty, the ratification of the 1978 constitution, and the successful elections of 1977, 
1979, and 1982 along with the victory of the Socialist Party. However, these political and 
historical debates on politics, regional autonomy, and historical and collective memory 








Chapter 1: Beginning of the Transit ion and the Question on Amnesty and 
Legalization of Political Parties (1975-1977) 
 
 This chapter is an analysis of the political rise of Adolfo Suárez and later the 
Unión de Centro Democrátic Partido (Democratic Center Party), the fall of Carlos Arias 
Navarro (Franco’s last Prime Minister), and the decision by leaders of Spain to provide 
amnesty, political reform, and to legalize all other political parties in Spain. The central 
arguments made throughout this period were the decision by Suárez to legalize the PSOE 
(the Spanish Socialist Party) and the PCE (the Spanish Communist Party). First, why did 
King Juan Carlos disapprove Arias Navarro as the prime minister and why was Suárez 
the solution to create a peaceful transition to democracy? Franco groomed Juan Carlos to 
be the next head of state and to continue his legacy. However, he decided not to continue 
Francoism and instead chose a reformer within the regime.  
Second, what significance did Suárez play in the legalization of the Socialist 
Party? Suárez, as prime minister, spoke to opposition leaders directly. These leaders 
included Felipe González, leader of Socialist and Santiago Carrillo, leader of the 
Communist Party. However, there were conflicts within the government and military 
leaders in allowing the communists to return as a legal political party, even though the 
Communist Party had changed its rhetoric of violent revolution and favored democracy. 
Third, how did the legalization of the PCE in 1977 lead to the success of the June 15, 
1977 elections held in Spain. The 1977 election was an event of great significance and it 





provided a substantial step to the Spanish transition as Suárez decided to include former 
enemies of Franco. 
  After the coronation of King Juan Carlos in November 22, 1975, the Spanish 
press, such as Cuadernos para el Diálogo and Cambio 16, asked if the Spanish citizens 
wanted to move on to democracy. Cuadernos para el Diálogo, once a Spanish Catholic 
magazine that tilted towards the left, entitled its December 1975 issue, “España quiere 
Democracia” (Spain wants Democracy).1 The editorial directed its attention at the post-
Franco leadership, specifically Arias Navarro’s leadership, and the demands for change 
and reform. It stated, “It is curious to observe the resistance of change of the stagnant 
conservatives that are in the Arias government as his main source of support. Not only in 
the imposition of a decree of an unsatisfactory pardon for the nation but a contradiction 
from the King’s words regarding ‘“the King for all.’”2 This article was specifically about 
exiled political leaders of the opposition and political prisoners. The words of Juan Carlos 
as a King of all Spaniards resonated with the actions by the regime.  
 The New York Times reported that on November 25, 1975, King Juan Carlos 
pardoned some political prisoners.3 According to the decree, “Several thousand persons 
are expected to benefit from the decree, which was signed by the King. The pardon, 
which he hailed as a tribute to the memory of General Franco, was graduated according 
to the length of sentences, with persons sentenced to less than three years to be freed 
immediately. The decree does not apply…to crimes of terrorism…”4 However, Cambio 
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16, a magazine that originally centered on economics but shifted more into politics, 
reported criticisms of this light amnesty. The journalist Marino Barbero Santos argued 
that, "On 25 November a new general pardon was granted on the occasion of the 
proclamation of Juan Carlos of Bourbon as King of Spain. The first reactions in legal 
circles have been frankly disappointment. Greater generosity was expected.”5 The push 
for proper amnesty for all political prisoners became the goal of the opposition forces 
against the Franco regime.  
 El País, a daily newspaper that started its circulation in May 1976, criticized 
Franco’s legacy. They called for political reform in Spain and became one of Spain’s 
leading newspapers in the coming years. On May 4, 1976, El País published an editorial 
about reform entitled “Ante la “reforma.”’6 In the article the editors wrote,  
Since the death of General Franco, and maybe before, since the assassination of 
President Carrero, our people remain in a constant and prolonged expectation of 
political change that has not just taken place…It is not a question of impatience. 
This country has waited for forty years – exactly since the beginning of the civil 
war – for the normalization of their political coexistence. This country, whose 
three-fourths of the population did not participate in that fratricidal struggle, has 
been searching, for the same reason, for almost half a century for civilized and 
modern forms of life…7  
 
For the press on the left, Spaniards had patiently waited for the return of democracy. 
Moreover, this opinion piece from El País showcased the memory of the Spanish Civil 
War and how it lingered in the minds of journalists. The editorial reported on the 
collective memory of Spaniards in the 1970s when Admiral Carrero Blanco and Franco 
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died. Part of the theme of the Spaniards of the 1970s was patience for a democratic 
government.  
Arias Navarro’s Resignation 
Carlos Arias Navarro was Franco’s last appointed Prime Minister of Spain from 
1973 to 1976. He became prime minister after the assassination of Admiral Carrero 
Blanco by ETA in 1973.8 Unlike Blanco, Arias Navarro was not a military man but he 
was a supporter of Franco. Once Franco died, the King had to decide: either keep Arias 
Navarro or move forward with someone that had the qualifications to reform the country. 
According to Paul Preston, the King and Arias Navarro’s relationship started off horribly 
due to members of his cabinet favoring the continuation of authoritarian rule.9 The King 
knew that Arias Navarro would have to leave his position if the country went through a 
democratic path.   
Moreover, the press continued to pound the ‘bunker’ or the ultra-conservative 
politicians and bureaucrats who remained loyal to Franco. Cambio 16 wrote a piece on 
the ‘bunker’ and its leader, Arias Navarro. The editors wrote that, “When democracy 
rings, the bunker falters. Only words are in the air and those who dwell in this strange 
citadel of imprecise limits already shake.”10 The ‘bunker’ represented the last blockade of 
democracy and they became the targets of ruptura democracia (democratic rupture) of 
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Francoism towards a transition to democracy. Democratic rupture was a process of the 
complete overhaul and eradication of Francoism in the Spanish government.  
Furthermore, the editors of Cambio 16 criticized Arias Navarro’s speech to the 
consejeros nationales (The National Council).11 They wrote that Arias Navarro 
mentioned Franco and liberty multiple times. The editors wrote,  
The head of the government, who used almost as many times the word 
"participation" (nine times) as "authority" (eight), quoted the "people" in twenty-
eight occasions, on "Franco", ten, "freedom", six; "King" in five, and finally, 
"democracy", in four sections of his speech. Not surprisingly, the prime minister, 
who did not arouse enthusiasm in the political chamber charged with ensuring the 
purity of the National Movement's principles, did not set dates for the realization 
of that reform program that will include free elections and the legalization of two 
political parties.12  
 
The editors of Cambio 16 called out the prime minister for the lack of substantial reforms 
that included free elections and the legalization of political parties. The following week, 
the editors of Cambio 16 wrote a scathing headline entitled, “The Opposition: Everyone 
against Arias,” that focused on the opposition united against the Arias Administration.”13 
The piece stated, “The reviled speech of President Arias in the Congress and before the 
country will have had a virtue: to unite in practice all the opposition against the 
announced program of the government.”14 In that report, the opposition included the 
socialists, communists, the Christian Democrats, the Catalonian assembly and the UGT.15 
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King Juan Carlos visit to the United States in April 1976 helped the opposition. 
The King told Newsweek about his harsh criticisms of Arias Navarro. According to the 
report,  
Spain’s new ruler is gravely concerned about right-wing resistance to political 
change. The time for reform has come, he believes, but Prime Minister Carlos 
Arias Navarro, a holdover from Franco’s days, has demonstrated more immobility 
than mobility. In the King’s opinion, Arias is an unmitigated disaster, for he has 
become the standard-bearer of that powerful band of Franco loyalists known as 
“the bunker.”16 
 
Preston later argued that the King “…allowed himself to be quoted in Newsweek.”17 This 
statement by the King had an impact on Spanish politics because both Arias Navarro and 
Juan Carlos had been appointed by Franco to continue his legacy. However, the King 
publicly criticized Arias Navarro. 
The King had doubts that Arias Navarro would reform the government into a 
more open and reformed democratic state. As the historians Raymond Carr and Juan 
Pablo Fusi argued,  
On 28 April Arias gave the King every reason to confirm the Newsweek article. 
His televised address to the country to explain once again the future of his 
political reform sounded like a provocation to the democratic opposition. He 
mentioned Franco seven times, calling him ‘the veteran captain’ and ‘the 
provident legislator…’ He once again ignored the question of an amnesty and 
rejected the possibility of opening a constituent period.18  
 
Under Arias Navarro’s leadership, Spain’s transition to democracy had been sluggish and 
obstructed by the last die hard supporters of Francoism. Juan Carlos had lost patience 
with the Arias Navarro administration.  
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Ultimately Arias Navarro resigned on July 1, 1976. According to Henry Ginger of 
the New York Times, the resignation was unexpected even to the ministers.19 El País 
reported on the opposition leaders’ reaction to the resignation. For example, Felipe 
González’s response was,  
We interpret the resignation of Arias as a positive factor, since Mr. Arias 
symbolized the continuation of a historical stage that the ensemble of all 
Spaniards wants to see overcome. Based on this analysis we have insisted to other 
opposition forces on the need to guide pressure of public opinion and all 
democratic political forces towards the resignation of a government that is 
compelled on carrying out the reforms back to the people, with a style that we 
have repeatedly described as despotic.20 
 
González’s reaction was optimism after the news of Arias Navarro’s resignation. 
González, along with the official Socialist Party’s newspaper El Socialista, denounced 
the Arias Navarro administration’s failure in changing and reforming the government into 
a democratic nation.21 Moreover, Santiago Carrillo, the Secretary General of the Spanish 
Communist Party, response was, “If Arias Navarro's resignation serves to form a Cabinet 
that is less repressive, capable of dialogue with the democratic opposition, without 
discrimination, and to facilitate the expression of popular demands, then it will be a step 
forward.”22 Carrillo understood that in order for the transition to succeed, the government 
would have to find a leader willing to change Spain from its authoritarian past.  
                                                          
19 “Spanish Premier Resigns, Apparently at King’s Wish,” New York Times, July 2, 1976, 
http://search.proquest.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/122788857/pageviewPDF/B40CB4AC5E054022PQ/
1?accountid=14696 (accessed January 6, 2017). 
20 “La Dimisión de Arias: raectiones a la dimisión de preseidente,” El País, July 2, 1976, 
http://elpais.com/diario/1976/07/02/espana/205106416_850215.html (accessed January 10, 2017). 
21 “Nuestra Posicion,” El Socialista, July 1976, Library of Congress, Microfilm, Shelf No. 
NP2849, Reel No. 2168 
22 “La Dimisión de Arias: reactiones a la dimisión de presidente,” El País, July 2, 1976, 





 On July 2, the United States Embassy in Madrid reported on the opposition’s 
strong response to the failures of the Arias administration. In an excerpt from the 
memorandum, the American Embassy in Madrid reported to the U.S. State Department 
on what the opposition stated. On points 2 and 3, the report stated,  
2. We are compelled to denounce before the country the so called constitutional 
reform and the announced referendum, which are nothing but a political 
masquerade. We denounce the reforms because they are being imposed by the 
government without the full and free participation of the people. We denounce the 
referendum because it is nothing more than a mechanism for obtaining popular 
approval for a unilateral and antidemocratic reform. 
 
3. A democratic future is only possible with: (1) Full and complete amnesty for all 
those in prison or exile for political reasons; (2) Effective guarantees for the 
exercise of civil liberties and full freedom for political parties; and (3) The 
formation of a truly representative government which will initiate, without delay, 
the "peaceful transition to a true democracy."23 
This statement made by the opposition concluded that Arias Navarro did not allow any 
members of the opposition to have a voice on the political reforms. It was these 
grievances that led to the downfall of Arias Navarro’s role as prime minister. 
Meanwhile, editors of the conservative Catholic newspaper Ya wrote a statement 
that this sudden change should “…have a government that is strong, representative, and 
open. A strong government that can solve the economic crisis, to contain the irrational 
extremists on the left and the right…To ask for an open government, we have been 
calling repeatedly: no rupture nor a constitutional process, which has always appeared as 
a grave mistake…”24 Ya noted that the change to democracy should not happen but it did 
not need the extremists on the left and the right. Nonetheless, the question for 
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conservatives was how Arias Navarro’s resignation would change Spain into a nation that 
followed the old Second Republic and react against the Francoists.  
Furthermore, the historian Javier Tusell analyzed the significance of the Arias 
Navarro era and his resignation in history. In Tusell’s opinion, “From a historical point of 
view, what was most relevant about this period was that…it ended all possibility that 
Francoism could survive in any form, and it contributed decisively towards making a 
sweeping reform seem inevitable…”25 The decisions made by Juan Carlos proved that he 
himself wanted political reform in Spain. Arias Navarro’s resignation was the end of 
Francoism as a legitimate ideology for the ultra conservatives in modern Spain. It was a 
major blow to the ‘bunker’ and Franco’s legacy. 
Adolfo Suárez’s Leadership, Amnesty and Reconciliation 
Adolfo Suárez became the new prime minister of Spain on July 3, 1976. He was 
prime minister throughout most of the transition. Under his leadership, he legalized the 
Communist Party, provided significant laws of amnesty, led the negotiations of the 
Moncloa Pacts that would reform the Spanish economy, and assisted in the creation and 
ratification of the Spanish Constitution of 1978. To start, Suárez wanted to reassure the 
people that he was for democratic change. For example, on July 6, Suárez spoke to 
Spaniards on television about his commitment to obtain a modern democracy.26 Suárez 
had been a member of the Franco administration as the Director-General of Spanish 
Television, or Spanish public broadcasting, from 1969 to 1973.27 He later became the 
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Vice Secretary General of the Movimiento, a Francoist institution28 and established 
himself as one of the top members of the Franco regime. Overall, Suárez had the youth, 
experience, and credentials to push for a faster and smoother transition. While Suárez had 
previous positions in the Franco regime, his decisions afterwards led to the first free 
elections in Spain since 1936. 
Still the news surprised some Spaniards given Suárez’s history. For example, the 
Spanish journalist Victoria Prego wrote that, “The news of the order by the King of 
appointing Adolfo Suárez as president of the Government is a surprise for all political 
observers, without exception.”29 The King pushed for Suárez as prime minister of the 
government. Nevertheless, the editors of El País wrote that,  
We have always believed that the departure of Arias from the Cabinet was in fact 
a historic opportunity to implement a policy of harmony and democracy. If the 
new prime minister is not successful in selecting his team, the damage to the 
Spanish historical process and, ultimately, to the Crown, will be very difficult to 
repair. The challenges that Mr. Suárez has encountered and found in cooperating 
are not the result of any personal rejection but of the conviction that this 
Government must be able to prepare in the short term a free general election in 
the midst of an economic crisis and extreme social conflict.30  
 
El País wondered what direction the country would take even though Suárez had the 
authority to push for free elections in the middle of a political and social conflict. Unlike 
Arias Navarro, Suárez was not handpicked by Franco to become prime minister but he 
was not trusted either by the opposition. 
Still, the editors of Cambio 16 had some optimism about Suárez as the new prime 
minister. In their editorial about the transition from Arias Navarro to Suárez, they 
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justified Suárez and stated, “In the possession of the young politician is his youth, his 
modernist air and his last speech before the Cortes. And not much more. Faced with 
personalities experienced in long years of battle to bring democracy to Spain without 
traumas, the new president is bound to have a rare role...”31 Suárez, along with other 
leaders of the opposition parties, was not alive during the Spanish Civil War. The press 
did have some confidence that Suárez’s youth might be the key to a successful 
democratic transition.  
July 1976 continued to be a significant month in Spain. Suárez proved he was 
serious in reforming the country. There were two laws that passed and had an impact in 
moving forward with the transition: reform of the Penal Code and amnesty of some 
political parties such as the Socialist Party.32 On July 19, according to Casanova and Gil 
Andres, “…the Cortes passed the reform of the Penal Code that brought about the 
legalisation of certain political parties…”33 On July 30, Spain passed an amnesty decree 
that conceded amnesty to political prisoners in Spain. Before the enactment of the law, 
the U.S. embassy in Madrid reported that on July 17, the Spanish government was 
prepared to mobilize a plan for amnesty. The U.S. State Department had great interest in 
the transition due to the normalized relations during the Cold War.34       
According to the referendum the key word was reconciliation, a word that defined 
the relationship between the opposing parties of the left and the right. In the report from 
the embassy in Madrid to the State Department, they stated, “But the declaration itself 
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reflects a clear reformist bent, on designed to appeal to all sectors in its emphasis on 
"National Reconciliation", a code word of considerable importance to the democratic 
opposition.”35 In addition. Casanova and Gil Andres explained that, “…on 30 July the 
government issued a partial but significant amnesty decree and initiated contacts with 
leaders of the democratic opposition, including nationalists such as Jordi Pujol and 
socialists such as Felipe González and Tierno Galván, but not with the communists who 
were still considered to be ‘inapplicable for legislation.”36 This ruling by the Spanish 
government paved the way for Suárez to contact opposition leaders such as the Socialist 
Party. 
Bonifacio de la Cuadra, a journalist for El País, reported that this amnesty 
included the potential for political prisoners to be freed,  
In response to questions from the special envoy of EL PAIS on the number of 
prisoners to be affected by the amnesty and on the possible complementary 
measure of the amnesty, although it lacked exact data, at the moment it would be 
about 200 prisoners - although the figure was later set by reliable sources at 500 - 
who would benefit from the amnesty...37 
 
Furthermore, this law allowed some of the skepticism from the left towards Suárez’s 
efforts of compromise to dissipate. El Socialista responded to the news with optimism 
about a successful transition through a democratic rupture. The editors of El Socialista 
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announced that, “Finally, the government has awarded amnesty for the crimes of political 
opinion… The transition from a dictatorship to a democracy is in play. The political 
responsibility of the opposition parties has us think that democracy is next and it will 
reach peacefully. If that does not happen, the current power will pay for their mistakes.”38 
The socialists were optimistic because they no longer had to fear going to prison for their 
political opinions and that the state was releasing political prisoners. In less than a month 
in office, Suárez led the first major steps in political amnesty for all. 
 However, there was criticism by the left that the amnesty was not enough to 
achieve the full legalization of all political opposition. For example, the Communist Party 
was still illegal and not all political prisoners were free. Sebastian Garcia, a journalist for 
El País, wrote about the defense lawyers for the remaining political prisoners’ thoughts 
on the new amnesty. He reported that, in the view of the lawyers,  
“the amnesty produced is not complete, as requested, and therefore cannot be the 
starting point of a government that intends to go to democracy through 
reconciliation.” This is the first conclusion reached by lawyers of most of the 
Spanish political prisoners... Second, it was said that the amnesty decreed, with its 
limitations, to some extent gives the go-ahead to the trials followed under the 
Francoist legal system, since the limits cited are imposed on the basis of this 
legality. Thus…the Franco regime is still alive in the amnesty, the lawyers said, 
since from their laws it has been said who are excludable.39 
 
Political prisoners had hope for a more democratic rupture instead of a compromised 
negotiation for amnesty. Progress was made but the defense lawyers criticized the 
political amnesty because of the Spanish government’s call for democracy without 
releasing prisoners that opposed the Franco regime. The defense lawyers pressured the 
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government that the amnesty laws had limits even during the change in leadership from 
Arias Navarro to Suárez. Nevertheless, in one month Suárez and his administration, along 
with the parliament, started off well in pushing for political reform and change in Spain. 
Ruptura Democrática and the Socialist Party’s 27th Party Congress 
 With the legalization of the Socialist Party, how did the socialists respond to not 
only the reforms made by Suárez, but the creation of the referendum on political reform 
that would allow free elections? The 27th Congress for the Socialist Party in Spain took 
place in December 1976 which became a historic moment for the party. It was the first 
congress by the socialists in Spain since the Second Republic in the 1930s.40 The 
congress was a celebration but also a bold statement for a democratic rupture in Spain. 
Ideologically, the party wanted to generate success with a strong party platform against 
the democratic conservatives and the Suárez administration. In the prologue of the 
congress, the PSOE declared that,  
The personality of the Socialist Party is defined by its defense of freedom and by 
its will to transform capitalist society into a socialist society. Socialism demands 
freedom, justice, truth, equality. When groups of different ideologies, dominated 
by conservatism or by years of an authoritarian theory and practice, want to 
assimilate to the socialist cause, the Congress has indicated with its motto what is 
the cry of the Socialists: SOCIALISM IS FREEDOM.41 
 
The PSOE continued to demand democracy in Spain but only through the idea of 
socialism as the effective ideology to transform the country. Thus, socialism equaled 
liberty to the Spanish socialist leaders. As the political scientist Paul Kennedy states, 
“…for the first time in its history, the PSOE declared itself to be a ‘Class Party, and 
therefore a Mass Party, Marxist and democratic’ and rejected ‘any accommodation with 
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capitalism or simple reform of the capitalist system.’”42 The idea was for social 
democracy and that socialism would win a free and fair election without violence. For the 
socialists, the memories of the tragedy of the Second Republic lingered on since the last 
free election took place before the Spanish Civil War and they rejected dictatorship. 
 In addition, Felipe González, the leader of the Socialist Party, played a significant 
role of leading the socialists during the transition. In a speech by González to the 
members of the 27th congress titled “El proyecto socialista” (The Socialist Project), he 
said, “Officially Spain would cease to be a country in which only the triumphant forces in 
the civil war existed and the existence and the strong implantation of the political forces 
formally defeated in the contest would be recognized.”43 The winners of the Spanish 
Civil War were the Nationalists and Franco supporters that for decades glorified Franco.  
 Furthermore, González spoke about current events in Spain with the December 
15th referendum. The referendum was a political reform effort by Suárez and the Spanish 
parliament that would later be called the Law for Political Reform. González argued that 
the democratic opposition influenced the Suárez administration until the approval of the 
December 15 referendum.44 Moreover, González declared in a statement about the 
referendum that,  
From our point of view, before the realization of the general elections, a 
transitional stage must be covered, in which conditions must be given to ensure 
that a clean democratic alternative is derived from them...that these choices can be 
identified with the proposed objective of a democratic rupture. For this reason, the 
party and other democratic forces are defending that the process of the transition 
be negotiated, that the aspirations of nationalities and regions be respected, that 
the freedom of all political parties be guaranteed, that it be discussed and accepted 
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by the law, and should preside over the electoral process and that the government 
covering the transitional period enjoys a democratic consensus.45 
 
González’s statement became a rallying cry for progress in Spain. For example, Santos 
Juliá argues, “What Felipe González did in the forthcoming congress of the PSOE…by 
blurring the boundaries that delimited previously clear concepts such as rupture and 
reform, in fact opened a new political terrain.”46 Ultimately, González defined the role of 
the Socialist in the transition to democracy as the right party to oversee the democratic 
transition. His political leadership united the PSOE but it also provided the base some 
legitimacy of the democratic transition.  
Furthermore, the PSOE’s position on the transition became a statement about their 
socialist principles. During the 27th Congress, the leaders of the PSOE stated, 
Transcending the fascist state to a state of public liberties and formal democracy. 
Transition from the state of formal democracy to a state in which hegemony 
corresponds to the working class, maintaining and deepening freedoms. 
Transition from a Workers' Regime to a classless…society, in which all power 
apparatus is replaced by self-management at all levels.47  
 
The socialists still believed in a society without class. The optimism after Franco’s death 
provided rejuvenation for the PSOE. Javier Tusell stated that the 27th Congress, “…leads 
one to deduce that the PSOE of the time sought to define itself as radical…it is equally 
clear that these declarations did not go beyond mere words. Felipe González has said of 
himself that he was always a moderate, and this is probably true, though at that time his 
party did not appear moderate to the same extent.”48 The position of the socialists 
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changed gradually when the transition pushed for significant changes in the success of 
the Law for Political Reform. 
 El País reported on the congress with great interest and its editors informed, 
“Within the PSOE the figure of Felipe González earns points for moments. The 
management of its executive committee was unanimously approved - with a single 
abstention by the delegates of the congress.”49 González, as Secretary General of the 
PSOE, stood out and became an influential person for the Spanish left. Moreover, 
according to El País, González, “…proposed in his speech of the session...the 
establishment of a constitutional compromise between all democratic opposition forces to 
achieve a democratic constitution. In the speech, the Socialist leader exposed the political 
program of his party facing the next election period and the economic program to get out 
of the crisis of the current socio-economic situation.”50 González and the party agreed 
that Spain needed a new constitution for the transition to succeed. The Socialist Party’s 
success was an example for the potential victory of the Spanish left in the upcoming 
months to win the elections in 1977. 
The Law for Political Reform: December 15, 1976 
 A week after the Socialist Party’s 27th Party Congress, Spaniards voted to 
approve the Law for Political Reform. Suárez helped draft and negotiate a text of the 
law.51 Suárez’s role, as Paul Preston claimed, was that, “…with the aid of Tarcuato 
Fernández Miranda, Suárez was having considerable success in steering his reform 
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project through the Francoist institutions, although he was constantly worried that the 
obstacles could at any moment prove too great.”52 The optimism of passing this bill into 
law proved that Suárez had confidence in its success. The referendum’s significance even 
brought attention to the United States.  
On December 2, 1976, Manuel de Prado, a Spanish diplomat and a close aid to the 
King53 and at the time the Chairman of the board of IBERIA Airlines, spoke with the 
U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. During the 1970s, according to the political 
scientist Boris Leidtke, U.S. policy in Spain was to have a working relationship with the 
regime when Franco’s health declined and to not upset any of the moderate leaders.54 
Prado and Kissinger discussed the December 15th referendum and the Socialist Party’s 
27th congress. In that conversation, Prado stated, “…now we have the referendum on the 
15th of December. After we get the approval from the Cortes on the new reform law, the 
government will be stronger. We will still have some opposition, but they are not very 
well organized. We have given permission to the socialists to have their congress on the 
15th of December.”55 The U.S. had some doubts of the transitional period given the long 
years of authoritarian rule. However, Prado stated that the Suárez government would get 
stronger after the successful passing of the Law for Political Reform.  
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Furthermore, the report added that Kissinger asked about the referendum and 
Suárez’s prospects in staying in power. In their conversation, Kissinger and Prado 
discussed,   
The Secretary: …When did you say the referendum was going to take place? 
 
Prado: The referendum will be on December 15th. We will then form a new 
government before the elections take place in April. Our elections will then be in 
either April or May. 
 
The Secretary: Will Suarez still be Prime Minister afterwards? 
 
Prado: Yes, I think he probably will for a while.56 
 
This conversation showed that Prado and Kissinger had confidence that the referendum 
would pass but also lead to the rise in popularity and consolidation of Suárez as the prime 
minister of Spain. The key aspect of this law was the decision to have free elections in 
1977. Free elections had not occurred in Spain since 1936.  
The American journalist James A. Markham, covered the referendum for the New 
York Times in the month of December. He wrote that, “Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez 
appealed tonight to Spaniards to vote yes in a national referendum tomorrow and turn the 
nation into ‘a fully democratic society without risks and without fears.”57 Furthermore, 
the Spanish left and the right had differences of opinion on the law. The leaders of the far 
right urged their partisans to vote no because they feared that Franco’s legacy was 
disappearing.58 For the ultra conservatives or the ‘bunker,’ the ratification of this law by 
the people would destroy the memory of Franco as a historical hero in Spanish history. 
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The ultra conservatives feared that the referendum challenged and delegitimized their 
control and authority over Spain since the Nationalist victory in 1939.  
The referendum was passed successfully on December 15, 1976. What was the 
significant aspect of the law that Suárez vehemently pushed? Markham reported that, 
“Spaniards voted overwhelmingly yesterday in favor of a Government program to hold 
free elections next spring for a parliament that will have the power to rewrite the laws of 
the Franco period.”59 The law provided a gateway for other political parties to join the 
arena. In the view of Victoria Prego, “The affirmative vote is defended by legalized 
political parties belonging to the political right willing to accept the rules of 
democracy.”60 Moreover, it was the Spanish people that wanted democracy. For example, 
the editors of Cuadernos para el Diálogo had optimism about the drafting of this 
referendum. They proclaimed that, “Something changed. We still have no democracy, as 
it is said in this program last week, but it seems that the Spanish people are determined to 
have it.”61 Furthermore, Tusell argued that Spaniards felt that the referendum was a 
chance to express their opinions freely since the Civil War that ended in 1939 and that the 
vote would not be manipulated.62 Spaniards chose the option of allowing democracy to 
enter their lives even with the memory of the Second Republic’s end imbedded in their 
memories  
The Legalization of the Communist Party (PCE) 
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 After the success of the Law of Political Reform, the next difficult step was the 
legalization of the Communist Party. The communists had been in exile or imprisoned 
since the end of the Spanish Civil War and by January 1977 the PCE was still illegal.63 
Tusell summarized the current state of the PCE as a party that had not altered its 
leadership.64 The PCE maintained its core leaders such as Dolores Ibárruri who 
influenced the party. Santiago Carrillo was the Secretary of the Spanish Communist Party 
from 1960 to 1982. The goal of the PCE was, “With the dictatorship now well in the past, 
the attraction of a communism that had always been viewed as the arch-enemy of the 
regime had faded. Carrillo…showed a clear desire to avoid any danger of becoming 
inward-looking, and this led him during the election campaign to launch attacks on the 
AP but, in contrast, not against the UCD.”65 Furthermore, according to Raymond Carr 
and Juan Pablo Fusi, Carrillo coined the phrase ruptura pactada (negotiated break).66 A 
negotiated break was similar to a democratic rupture that targeted the remnants of 
Francoism and to eradicate it for the transition. 
The communists changed their plans for revolution against the Franco regime. In 
1956, the Spanish communists called for a “national reconciliation”67 that ultimately led 
to the ideas of Eurocommunism. According to the political scientists Richard Gunther, 
Joan Boatella, and José Ramón Montero, the Communist Party was, “…repudiating the 
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concept of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in 1972, shifting from the cell structure of 
party organization to the more open branch structure in 1976, and removing the term 
Leninist from its self-designation in 1978.”68 For example, the novelist and communist 
Jorge Semprún spent his time in exile listening to Carrillo speeches about the transition in 
person. He recollected in his writing that,  
…in September 1975, at the Second National Conference of the Spanish 
Communist Party…Carrillo persisted in declaring: “Over and against any sort of 
formula for continuity, the democratic alternative will continue to be our solution. 
If the succession of Juan Carlos takes place, we will take advantage of the 
weakening of the entire power structure to impose, with the masses in the streets, 
the democratic objectives that Spanish society demands, culminating in the 
political revolution that will put an end to all the holdovers of dictatorial 
power.”69 
 
The call for democracy by Carrillo highlighted the evolution of the Spanish communists 
in the 1970s and their goal to return to prominence in Spanish politics. The democratic 
alternative was a similar political strategy to the Socialist Party’s democratic rupture. 
Carrillo called it Eurocommunism which had some similarities and differences with 
social democracy, 
Carrillo, who wrote a book on Eurocommunism during the transition, argued that 
Eurocommunism, “…proposes to transform capitalist society, not to administer it…At 
the same time, the ‘Eurocommunist’ strategy aims to bring about a convergence with the 
socialist and social democratic parties, with the progressive Christian forces, with all the 
democratic groups that are not henchmen of monopoly-type property. These aims are not 
contradictory…”70 The communists did not want to continue capitalist practices if they 
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won elections but they were willing to work with other political parties that had their 
ideals. While the communists did not renounce revolution, they knew that the people 
would accept formal democracy over another authoritarian dictatorship of the right.  
However, Carrillo’s time in Spain after Franco’s death did not start well. On 
February 7, 1976, Carrillo secretly entered Spain where he was still not allowed to enter 
the country.71 To make things worse, the government struggled to support the legalization 
of the Communist Party. Carrillo challenged the Spanish government when he was seen 
in Madrid on December 10.72 The decades of demonizing the communists played a key 
role in the difficult task of legalizing the PCE. According to Carr and Fusi,  
The democratic opposition could not accept its exclusion from political life – 
indeed they argued that the party’s emergence from the mystery of clandestinity 
into the electoral field would expose its relative weakness. Since the end of the 
Civil War the suppression of ‘Marxism’ had been presented in the propaganda of 
the regime as its raison d’être and the legalisation of the PCE was still bitterly 
opposed by former reformists like Fraga.”73  
 
Manuel Fraga was the head of the Alianza Popular (AP) during the transition. The 
communists had to overcome the decades of hatred by the Franco regime and the 
memories of the Spanish Civil War. The communists were the enemy of the state by 
Franco and his supporters. They had to challenge the conservatives that wanted no 
compromise and no reconciliation with them. 
 El País and Cuadernos para el Diálogo covered Carrillo’s imprisonment in late 
1976 when he secretly went to Spain even though he was banned. The publications 
reported the protests by Carrillo’s supporters. On December 24, 1976, El País reported 
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that, “Several wounded and numerous bruised is the provisional balance of the 
demonstration attempts made yesterday afternoon around the Puerta del Sol, in protest of 
the arrest of Santiago Carrillo, secretary general of the PCE.”74 These protests did not 
stop there. Editors of Cuadernos para el Diálogo called Santiago Carrillo “…El preso del 
año” (prisoner of the year).75 They wrote that,  
The arrest of Carrillo has renewed national passions. The captivity of the 
secretary general of the PCE has served as a "test" to test the reactivity of various 
key sectors in the near future of the country. Carrillo has been the prisoner of the 
year, the great piece collected by the heirs of the Franco regime. His captured, on 
the other hand, is not comfortable for a Government that is going to manage 
presumably democratic elections in five months.76 
 
For the opponents of the left, Carrillo’s bold moved helped the push for the legalization 
of the Communist Party. If the first elections since the Second Republic were to be in 
mid-1977, then the arrest of the communists needed to stop for a smooth democratic 
transition. 
 Moreover, the Communist Party had other opponents to their legalization besides 
the far right. According to the same conversation earlier between Henry Kissinger and 
Manuel Prado, they both had concerns over the legalization of the Communist Party. In 
that conversation, they discussed the possible legalization of the PCE: 
Prado: Brandt might encourage Suarez to make some moves towards the 
communists, but I doubt whether he will encourage Gonzalez to do the same. The 
King said to tell you that we will never give permission to the communists to join 
openly in the political process. 
 
The Secretary: Well, you know my position. The American government cannot 
give the King of Spain advice on how he should run the internal affairs of his 
country. As far as I’m concerned, the decision you take should be whichever 
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decision gives you the stablest government. You will simply have to weigh the 
pros and cons to see where the balance lies. Personally, I cannot shed tears over a 
party which declares all other parties illegal. 
 
Prado: Our problem is the army. It would probably revolt if we legalized the 
communist party. Kreisky, who was with me in Las Palmas, said he thought it 
would probably be better to legalize the communist party…We simply do not 
have the tradition of compatibility which would allow us to take the same attitude. 
Carrillo was in Madrid last week, illegally, as always. He wanted to get a passport 
to come to Mexico City. Frankly, we think he’s pushing too fast. We don’t want 
to declare the communist party official yet. On the other hand, we don’t want to 
cause problems.77 
 
The conversation between Kissinger and Prado was that the King had opposed the 
inclusion of the communists as a legitimate party. The military still had influence in 
Spanish politics even after Franco’s death and many were still loyal to Franco. Kissinger, 
an anti-communist, continued this policy but he did not stay as Secretary of State after 
1976 because Jimmy Carter won the 1976 Presidential Election. Thus, American policy 
on the PCE’s legalization ended with Carter’s victory.78 However, Kissinger’s policy was 
not to vehemently persuade the King’s decision on the Communist Party.   
In addition, the government had to balance a tight rope to not cause any strife with 
the socialists and other parties of the left versus the conservatives and the members of the 
‘bunker.’ Paul Preston summarized Suárez’s difficulties legalizing the Communist Party: 
“For the bunker and the army, to legalize the Communists meant throwing away 
everything that they had fought for in 1936.”79 The military leadership felt that the 
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communists were still the enemy and compounded the problems of the negotiations for 
Suárez. The memory of the Spanish Civil War could not be easily erased given the 
politics that affected these powerful conservatives in the government.  
 However, as with González, Carrillo communicated, negotiated, and met with 
Suárez over the transition as he eventually left prison. According to Victoria Prego, “The 
encounter between Suárez and Carrillo was celebrated in top secret.”80 This secret 
meeting took place on February 27, 1977 due to the political controversy surrounding the 
communists at the time. In the meeting, “…Carrillo agreed to accept the monarchy and 
the bicolor flag as part of the price for the legalization of the PCE.”81 In exchange, 
“Suárez promised to create a political system in which Juan Carlos was to be a king with 
symbolic duties but no governing powers.”82 Carrillo and Suárez fulfilled their promises 
to each other as a symbol of trust and compromise between two opposing politicians.  
On April 9, 1977, the Communist Party became legal in Spain. Suárez risked his 
political career on this decision. As Linz and Stepan had pointed out, “The decision to 
legalize the Communist Party was extremely dangerous…Suarez’s difficult choice 
proved decisive in assuring the moderate Euro-Communist posture of the Spanish 
Communist Party and its leader Santiago Carrillo  and thus made a contribution to the 
eventual success of the Spanish transition.”83 Furthermore, the political scientist Omar 
Encarnación observed an important purpose for the legalization of the PCE: “Suárez also 
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recognized that the exclusion from the 1977 elections of the PCE, at the time the largest 
and best-organized party in Spain, would have certainly posed a serious problem of 
legitimacy for the new democracy.”84 The communists had mobilized clandestinely and 
in exile for decades and their legalization meant peace and reconciliation between former 
enemies. 
In addition, the U.S. embassy in Madrid reported that, “In a surprise move 
obviously calculated to find most Spaniards diverted by the celebration of Easter and 
immersed in affairs of the family…The Interior Ministry announced late last night the 
inscription of the PCE in the register of legal political parties.”85 Suárez led the 
legalization behind the army’s back.86 While in Paris, Carrillo made a statement that this 
legalization “…fortifies and lends credibility to the democratization process…”87 Other 
politicians such as Ramon Rubial of the Socialist Party proclaimed that the successful 
legalization of the Communist Party was part of the struggle88 and Fernando Alvarez de 
Miranda of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) called it “…an appropriate and 
opportune measure;” it will reduce tensions.”89 These political parties had significant 
praise for this decision to legalize the Communist Party.  
El País and Cambio 16 reported this news as a historical moment for the post-
Franco period. In El País, the headline proclaimed “El Partido Comunista de España, 
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legalizado” (The Communist Party of Spain legalized). The editors wrote, “The Spanish 
communist party was legalized yesterday, after it was banned for 40 years…In the middle 
of the democratic opposition, the legalization of the PCE has gotten general satisfaction, 
and considered an essential step for normalizing the democratic process.”90 Meanwhile, 
Cambio 16’s editorial welcomed the communists back to Spain after decades of exile as a 
legal party. The editors of Cambio 16 praised the new ruling and wrote that 
"Communists, Communists, welcome. You have played a huge and conflictive role in the 
last half century of the history of Spain. Today you are one of the most solid parties in the 
country, you have suffered the dictatorship harshly and you have become a touchstone of 
democracy."91  
In addition, the New York Times quoted Enrique Santin, the chief of staff of the 
ministry, about his statement that the Communist Party was registered officially and 
became an official political party on the registry.92 Furthermore the New York Times 
reported that Carrillo was satisfied but did not trust Suárez and did not see him as a 
“…friend of the communists.”93 Carrillo did give Suárez some respect as a leader of the 
transition. In a statement quoted by the New York Times, Carrillo said about Suárez, “I 
consider him an anti-Communist, but an intelligent one, who understands that ideas are 
not destroyed with reprisals and bans, and who is prepared to confront his ideas with 
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ours...”94 Carrillo and the rest of the communist leaders knew that Suárez had no 
intention of repeating the Francoist message of persecuting and imprisoning any 
opposition. The wounds were still there but the two men were willing to compromise. 
Three days later was the 46th anniversary of the Second Republic and the army 
had denounced this move by the Suárez government. As Paloma Aguilar wrote, “The 
reaction of the Consejo Superior del Ejército (Higher Army Council) was immediate, and 
on 14 April the Consejo issued a communiqué in which it expressed its strong 
condemnation of the legalization of the party, although it also announced its deference to 
this decision…”95 The military leaders of the bunker called it a “…fait accompli on the 
grounds of ‘national interests of a higher order.’”96 Furthermore, El País wrote about this 
event that, “Today, the 14 of April, the anniversary of the Spanish Republic, it must be 
said that only a constitutional and democratic monarchy, like the one that is in the process 
of being established, which recognizes the rights of all Spaniards – Republicans included 
– can reasonably overcome this transitional stage.”97 This piece was written by El País at 
the time of the military leaders complaints against the PCE’s legalization.  
ABC had major concerns with the legalization of the Communist Party. The 
editors claimed, “Caution that in any case obliged us to look, rather than to the letter of 
statutes, to the substantial history of a party headed by the same leaders - Dolores Ibarruri 
and Santiago Carrillo - during the terrible years of our civil strife.”98 ABC did not forget 
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the strong suspicion and mistrust with the communists in Spain since the 1930s. For 
example, Paloma Aguilar has connected the legalization of the PCE as a shock to the 
conservatives with the memory of the Civil War: “…the Civil War had been the logical 
and necessary consequence of the chaos that had existed in the mid-1930s and that it was 
folly to include a party in the political game that would be sure not to respect the rules of 
democracy.”99 The communists had to prove to the cynics and the anti-communists that 
they would pursue a democratic path then an authoritarian path. Nevertheless, the 
communist party were open to elections and this legalization had to happen before the 
start of the 1977 elections. 
The 1977 Elections 
 Once the Communist became legal in Spain, the next step in the transition was the 
first democratic elections in Spain since 1936. On April 15, 1977, Suárez and the Consejo 
de Ministros (Council of Ministers), that included the new Navy Minister, Admiral Pery 
Junquera, announced to the world that the first elections in forty years would take place 
on June 15, 1977.100 350 deputies and 267 senate seats for the Spanish parliament would 
be up for election in the nation.101 For Suárez, the plan was to develop a coalition that 
would win in June under his leadership. On May 3, 1977, the Unión de Centro 
Democrático (UCD) became an official political party whose ideology was center right. 
The announcement included Suárez officially running for prime minister. The 
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announcement reassured Suárez’s commitment to continue the work he made in the 
transition but also to grow and solidify the UCD as a legitimate party. 
In a speech to the Spanish people, Suárez explained his decisions during the 
transition that ranged from his desire to continue to be prime minister and his thoughts on 
the Communist Party. He stated,  
...the Spanish people are mostly moderate, and we have tried to respond to that 
quality with an open spirit. We have discussed as much as possible with the 
political forces that the change was not a simple laboratory operation, but a sum 
of efforts, ideas and criticism of all political parties that only has as a target and 
protagonist for the Spanish people. 
 
Measures of grace are being implemented because we know that the society of 
1977 wants to overcome all causes of confrontation and needs instruments for 
harmony. Our internal normalization corresponded to an effort to normalize our 
presence in the world. The political parties have come into play, we are closer to 
getting the bases for the social pact... 
 
...Spanish society won laboriously, but with a maturity that everyone honors us, 
their liberties and their undoubted right to organize their future.102 
 
Suárez addressed the people of Spain with the success of including all political parties in 
this historic transition. The social pact would be a new constitution and more amnesties 
in the future. 
Furthermore, Suárez addressed the legalization of the Communist Party and to his 
critics on the left and right. He directly stated that, “I, gentlemen, not only am I not a 
Communist, but I firmly reject its ideology, as the other members of the cabinet I preside 
over reject. But I am a democrat, and a true democrat. That is why I think our people are 
mature enough - and proves it every day - to assimilate their own pluralism.”103 The 







speech supported Suárez’s policy of including all political parties that included the 
opposition even if they were former enemies.  
Besides the UCD, the political parties involved in this new parliamentary election 
included old and new parties that were moderate, conservative, and left leaning, but also 
in the periphery of Spain where political parties formed in Catalonia and the Basque 
region. On the left were the PSOE and the PCE whose parties were some of the oldest in 
Spain. On the right was the Alianza Popular or the Popular Alliance (AP). According to 
Tusell, the party aroused fear and hostility and only attracted old members that supported 
Franco to its party.104 The two major parties outside of the center include the PNV or the 
Basque Nationalist Party and the center-right Catalonian party, the PDC or the Pacte 
Democràtic per Catalunya. The PDC were led by Jordi Pujol, a prominent leader of 
Catalonia.  
How did this election lead to the success of the UCD and the PSOE? According to 
Paul Preston, “…Spaniards wanted change, but not confrontation and this favoured 
Suárez and Felipe González. In contrast, Carrillo and Fraga awakened memories of the 
conflicts of the past.”105 Since it was the first elections since the Second Republic, the 
extremes of the left and the right did not gain favorability in this historic election. The 
PSOE mobilized under the leadership of González. They went on the offense against the 
ultra conservatives. At the same time, González stressed the importance of voting in these 
elections. On May 28, he said, “The present elections…will be more than just a fight for 
an alternative power. The PSOE proposes, as a first objective, to obtain a democratic 
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constitution…”106 The PSOE’s plan was democratic rupture and its platform stressed the 
importance of a new constitution.  
However, the UCD managed to make themselves as the party of Suárez. A 
political party that was built on Suárez’s success, a moderate platform for the transition, 
and the Spanish people felt the UCD called for more national unity.107 During the week 
of the election, leaders of each party appeared on television for one last appeal to the 
Spanish people. As reported by El País, Suárez proclaimed that,  
“I aspire to continue the task, because I have a political vocation,” …He 
emphasized that he had promised democracy from the legal point of view, “and 
with logical deficiencies we have succeeded,” and then he mentioned that, once 
the political reform has been made, there are other reforms that will be undertaken 
next, although it will not be possible to satisfy all claims overnight. “I cannot 
assure you,” he said, “immediate and miraculous solutions to those problems that 
have been dragging on for many years, even if the present freedom of expression 
makes them seem new. We are a country with deficient structures and legislation 
that does not conform to the reality of 1977.”108 
 
Suárez played to his strengths from his accomplishments of passing the Law for Political 
Reform and the legalization of political parties including the PCE. He hoped that these 
accomplishments would consolidate his victory in the June 15th elections. 
 On June 15, 1977, the election succeeded as the first big test for democracy in 
Spain. About 78 percent of the Spanish population voted.109 As Paul Preston put it, “The 
Franco regime had been laid to rest…”110 A legitimate democratic election was the 
beginning of a new era in Spain. Cambio 16’s editorial of this historic day was entitled 
“El día de la victoria” (The Day of Victory),  
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It is a kind of sublime historical revenge, we arrived at the elections of 1977, with 
such unanimity and approach of programs and parties, that the torn elections of 
February of 1936 seems to belong to another world…To break the dictatorship 
demanded to call free elections to endow the country with a democratic 
constitution. These elections are already here.111  
 
The history of liberalism in Spain connected journalists to a time when there was liberal 
democracy. Spaniards voted in an historical election that legitimized the nation as a major 
step in democracy.  
The UCD won 165 seats and the Socialist Party came in second with 118 seats.112 
Tusell stated, “The Union of the Democratic Center won approximately 34 percent of the 
votes cast and 165 members of parliament…The PSOE won 29 percent of the vote and a 
total of 118 deputies…the Spanish Communist Party won 20 seats and the Popular 
Alliance 16.”113 The historian Michael Richards argued, 
Some on the left expressed the view that the elections signified that the war was at 
last over, a sentiment expressed during the final address of the Madrid PSOE 
campaign of Felipe González in the stadium of Vallecas, centre of urban 
migration since the 1940s. The Socialists would not win the elections, however, 
voters were cautious – perhaps even fearful – and many flocked to the centre as 
the best guarantor of a peaceful transition.114 
 
Furthermore, in the opinion of Tusell, “There is no doubt at all the PSOE displayed the 
greatest dynamism, and along with its technical and organizational capabilities this meant 
that expectations continued to grow, almost tripling the initial production of 10 percent of 
the vote suggested by opinion polls.”115 The socialists had gained over 100 seats and 
would therefore have a lot of influence over the creation of the new Constitution. Overall, 
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the June 1977 elections had ushered in a new era and became a major step for Spain to 
move forward with the transition. The UCD, a relatively new coalition of the moderate 
right, had control over the democratic future of Spain. 
Conclusion 
 In less than two years, Spain went from an authoritarian dictatorship to having its 
first free elections in 41 years. The resignation of Arias Navarro and the decisions made 
by King Juan Carlos were the first steps of compromise and reconciliation between the 
Spanish political leaders. Adolfo Suárez as prime minister accomplished in his first years 
in office a challenging task. First, Suárez led and pushed for political reform that ended 
Spaniards exiled for opposing the Franco regime and legalized political parties. Second, 
he legalized the PSOE (the Socialist Party) and the PCE (the Communist Party). The 
Communist Party’s legalization became the ultimate test in the process of creating a new 
democracy in Spain. In Spain, the communists were the enemy dating back to the terrible 
years of the Civil War. For Suárez, to legalize the PCE after months of negotiations 
proved that he was the right man to lead the transition to democracy. Suárez’s efforts 
persuaded Carrillo into a pact over the Spanish flag and his efforts to prevent the military 
from taking control of the peaceful transition. Third, the June 15, 1977 elections 
succeeded with overwhelming numbers and support throughout most of the country. 
Spaniards chose moderate leadership and saw the UCD and the PSOE as the right 
political parties to lead the country out of authoritarianism.  
 However, the memory of the war still lingered. The military did not approve of 
allowing the communists back in the political arena. Moreover, the memory of the 





establishment. The creation of a new constitution would further open to the past. Suárez 
would now have to reform the Spanish economy and invite all political leaders from each 
party to create and ratify a constitution. Still, even with old wounds and current problems 
with terrorism from ETA and GRAPO,116 progress had been made and Spain had another 















                                                          












This chapter is an analysis on the creation and the ratification of the 1978 
Constitution, and how the major political parties of Spain, led by the UCD (The 
Democratic Center Party) relied on compromise to successfully create the Constitution 
from June 1977 to December 1978. In addition, this chapter analyzes other key events 
such as the Moncloa Pacts and the Amnesty Law of October 1977 and how these political 
pacts were part of the politics of consensus. During the transition, the constitutional 
debates included political parties from not only the left and the right, but others from 
different regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Provinces. The leadership of each 
political party resolved key issues for a successful transition to democracy. First, how did 
the process of drafting the new Constitution work in the Spanish Cortes1 after the success 
of the 1977 elections? Second, which leaders were involved with the drafting process and 
which political parties had a say in the drafting of this Constitution? Third, why did the 
politicians want a new democratic state that decentralized and allowed regions to have 
autonomy? These questions proved that the Spanish leadership wanted an overhaul of the 
Francoist attitudes about regional autonomy in Spain.  
 In this chapter I analyze sources from the Spanish parliament. This includes the 
Congreso de los Diputados (Congress of Deputies) and the Senate. I specifically analyze 
the Constitutional debates, essays from socialist leaders such as Felipe González and 
Alfonso Guerra, the PCE’s (Communist Party) 9th Congress, and newspaper and 
                                                          





magazine sources. The Constitutional debates provided key deliberations from political 
leaders that argued for the construction of a fair Constitution that included the interests of 
regional provinces and not just the central regions. Meanwhile, the success of the 
Constitution’s ratification showcased that most Spaniards agreed to its legitimacy and 
overwhelmingly voted for it. The ratification process had support from parties such as the 
PSOE (The Socialist Party) and the PCE (The Communist Party). Furthermore, the 
democratic process extended Adolfo Suárez’s popularity amongst his constituents and 
others but it bolstered the PSOE as an alternative moderate party. The 1978 
Constitution’s success united Spain as a nation of regional autonomous provinces and 
ended the dark chapter of Francoism in Spain.  
Democratic Momentum and the Constitutional Talks 
 After the June 1977 elections, the country’s new leaders in the Spanish parliament 
had their own ideas on the creation of a new constitution. For the Suárez administration, 
the election results, while good for the Democratic Center Party, had challenges with the 
left. The historian Julián Casanova mentioned that in the summer of 1977, the UCD did 
not win the absolute majority in Spain.2 The Socialist Party’s triumph as the second 
largest political party in the Spanish parliament, led to the UCD’s commitment to 
compromise in the construction of democracy. For the leaders of the new regime, there 
were four important steps for the completion of the transition: a general amnesty law, 
autonomy for regions and nationalities in Spain, the economy, and the drafting of a 
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constitution.3 Suárez had to invite all his allies and opponents over political reform on the 
creation of a new democratic constitution. 
 The political actors such as: Adolfo Suárez, Felipe González, King Juan Carlos, 
Santiago Carrillo, and Jordi Pujol, generally agreed on the values of reconciliation and 
compromise. Victor Ferreres Comella, a political scientist and expert on Spanish 
Constitutional Law, argues that Spaniards expressed moderation because they voted for 
the UCD over the AP (Popular Alliance Party) and the PSOE over the PCE.4 With the 
political leaders, moderation became the norm with even the most left wing and right 
wing parties after the 1977 election. According to Comella, “Manuel Fraga, the leader of 
the AP…was willing to convert old Francoists into conservative democrats…Santiago 
Carrillo… was a moderate communist.”5 The stage was set for political leaders to debate 
over the Constitution because of the results from the 1977 election. The reason was that 
the moderate parties and candidates such as the PSOE and UCD succeeded over far left 
and far right views such as the PCE and AP. 
 On July 22, 1977, King Juan Carlos spoke to the Cortes. He focused on the 
progress made in the transition but also pressed for a new constitution. First, the King 
proclaimed that, “Democracy has begun. It is undeniable…Now we need to try to 
consolidate it.”6 Second, Juan Carlos commented on the steps towards the completion of 
the steps toward consolidation.  
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...the country has many concrete problems unresolved on which the Spanish 
people expect the direct action of their representatives. The first thing is to create 
the appropriate legal framework for new social relations, in the constitutional, 
regional or human communication. The Crown wishes - and believes to interpret 
the aspirations of the Cortes - a Constitution that accommodates all the 
individualities of our people and guarantees their historic and current rights. It 
wishes to acknowledge the diverse reality of our regional communities and shares 
in this regard whatever aspirations that do not weaken but enrich and make more 
robust the unquestionable unity of Spain.7 
 
The King proclaimed his commitment to the democratic process in this speech. 
Moreover, he wanted to assure the lawmakers that he would support a Constitutional 
Monarchy and a constitution that included the individual and basic rights of Spaniards of 
all regions and diversities. 
Soledad Álvarez Coto, a journalist for El País, reported on the King’s speech that 
day. He wrote, “With the phrase "Democracy has begun" the King appeared before the 
deputies and senators as a constitutional Monarch, integrator and arbitrator and a supreme 
personality of popular sovereignty.”8 The King’s presence provided a symbol of unity of 
a politically divided nation. During the speech, the report by Coto also specified that the 
politicians in the Spanish parliament reacted positively to the King’s speech, that the 
King wished that the monarchy to be constitutional, and for the political leaders to 
immediately draft a new constitution.9 However, while the Communist Party applauded 
the King’s speech, the Socialist Party remained seated.10  
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The Constitutional Debates, July 27, 1977. 
On July 27, the Congress of the Deputies began its debates on the drafting of a 
constitution. Felipe González first spoke to the Congress about the role of the Socialist 
Party in Spain for democracy throughout history. He stated to the deputies, “After many 
vicissitudes, the Socialist Party, which was preparing for the fall of the Primoriverista 
[Primo de Rivera] Dictatorship in all its reach, rose in 1931 with a spectacular triumph, 
again in conjunction with the Republicans, becoming the first political force in Spain.”11 
González gave this speech as a historical reminder that the socialists were consistently 
against dictators in Spain. Furthermore, he mentioned the historical significance of the 
Republicans of the 1930s and the memory of the Second Republic as a challenge against 
Miguel Antonio Primo de Rivera, the military dictator of Spain in the 1920s. 
González also commented on the current events of the transition since Suárez led 
the country. In his thoughts on the June 1977 elections, he declared, “On this date, 
universal suffrage was reestablished directly and in secret. Despite the limitations 
imposed by the Law of Political Reform...the Socialists understood that this fact could 
mean the restoration of popular sovereignty.”12 The Law for Political Reform and the 
democratic election on June 1977 were a significant return to popular sovereignty and 
universal suffrage in Spain. González and the socialists claimed that they were the ones 
leading the way for elections and political amnesty. 
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 González listed five major points for the Constitution. He demanded the 
Constitution to include the right for people to unionize and he demanded the Constitution 
include the political, social, economic, and cultural rights for the youth and children.13 
This was a priority for the socialists to improve workers’ rights in a time when Spain had 
modernized. González wanted the Constitution to include the rights for the youth and 
children, recognize the rights for women, and he demanded that, “…an autonomous 
framework must be defined capable of responding generously to the aspirations and 
rights of the various peoples that compose Spain...to establish solidarity mechanisms that 
serve to keep harmoniously united all these peoples with their own personality.”14 
González’s speech represented the Socialist Party’s platform on issues of rights. These 
rights included the regional provinces that demanded political and cultural autonomy.  
Lastly, the socialists demanded liberty of conscience for every citizen and that the state 
enact and impose secularism in Spain.15 This last demand was a social challenge to 
moderate conservatives and these demands had an impact on part of the new 
Constitution.  
 In 1977, Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra proclaimed the importance of the 
drafting of a constitution through compromise. In an essay titled “La Alternativa 
Socialista” (The Socialist Alternative), they proposed, “In our pursuit to obtain this 
objective, we have proposed, with all the political democratic powers, a Constitutional 
Compromise, that contains all of the powers of the political parties and democratic 
participants in the electoral process…It is therefore proposed that the party…offers the 
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country a democratic Constitution.”16 González and Guerra argued for compromise in the 
creation of a new constitution that included all political parties. The socialists understood 
that pushing for a more moderate message would assist the Socialist Party to win future 
elections.  
 Later in 1978, González continued this political objective of a constitution for all. 
In an essay titled “Tareas Futuras y Modelo de Sociedad” (Future Tasks and Model of 
Society), he proclaimed, “We do not, therefore, want the Socialists to have a Constitution 
for the exclusive use of anyone. Neither the left nor the right. We pretend that the basic 
norm of our coexistence is an adequate framework in which the programs of the political 
forces can be put into practice without needing to question it permanently.”17 For 
González and the socialists, the Constitution should not have any biases against one 
political side. This was important for the socialists because of fairness whenever a law is 
put in place by whichever political party would be in power. 
After González spoke to the Congress of Deputies, Santiago Carrillo, Secretary 
General of the Communist Party, delivered his speech to the Congress on several 
important topics such as the new Constitution and political amnesty. Carrillo stated that 
the communists would cooperate in the creation of the Constitution that does not exclude 
any political and ideological group and that affirmed the principle of popular 
sovereignty.18 Similarly to González, Carrillo’s policy was the rights of Spaniards of all 
regions to have popular sovereignty. He and the PCE wanted the new Constitution, 
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“...that authentically solves the problem of regional and domestic liberties, indispensable 
for Spain to be a united state...”19 He called for the central government in Spain to not 
oppress regions that wanted autonomy within Spain. This question of respecting the 
rights of regions that wanted autonomy became one of the key dilemmas of the creation 
of the Constitution of 1978.  
 The amnesty debate on political crimes and political prisoners did not end after 
the 1977 elections. For Carrillo, the Spanish parliament needed to grant amnesty to 
Spaniards accused by the dictatorship of committing political crimes and to continue 
reconciliation between the state and the former opposition Spaniards against Franco.20 
Furthermore, he claimed that, “This amnesty must also have a working aspect and 
confirm the readmission in their jobs in the companies or in the hierarchy of the State, 
with all their rights, to those who were dismissed or removed for political reasons or 
union activities.”21 For the communists, the rights of workers who were fired for their 
political beliefs, had to change in order for a complete amnesty. The legalization of the 
Communist Party pushed them to establish themselves as the true party for the workers 
and the former and current political prisoners.  
 After Carrillo’s speech at the Congress, Jordi Pujol of the Democratic Catalonia 
Party, represented that region and its concerns over regional autonomy and democracy. 
He stated, “...there is a great hope in Catalonia: the hope that this Cortes will be the 
instrument of a great mission, a double mission, on the one hand, for the full recognition 
of the collective personality of the various regions and nationalities in Spain, and, on the 
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other hand, the creation of real solidarity, not fruit…of coercion, but fruit of the will to 
live together.”22 Pujol commented that Catalans had hope for the Spanish parliament for 
the first time in years. The push for autonomy would help heal the rift between the central 
government and the regions within Spain that had their own identities. He argued that 
autonomy and democracy in Spain were inseparable and that it was vital for the Catalans 
that they had a voice in the drafting of the new Constitution.23 
For the Basques, the PNV (the Basque Nationalist Party), was represented by 
Xavier Arzallus, a prominent Basque politician negotiated between the Basques and the 
Suárez administration. As with the Catalans, Arzallus called for regional autonomy for 
Euskadi (The Basque region). He listed three points that the Basques had debated for the 
right for regional autonomy. First, the right of autonomy “... is an inescapable 
requirement and repeatedly declared by the Basque people...we make our intentions 
public to devote all our parliamentary work to its achievement and urge the Cortes and 
the Government to proceed in a way that this attempt is realized as soon as possible.”24 
The PNV declared that they would cooperate with other deputies, through parliamentary 
work, over the autonomy of the Basque citizens.  
Second, Arzallus, the PNV, and other members of the Congress that were Basque, 
declared solidarity with other nationalities that wanted autonomy.25 The regions outside 
of Castile had a common cause for self-rule. Third, Arzallus argued, “As soon as this 
right is achieved, instantly implement measures of an administrative legal order that 
affects the provinces of Álava, Navarra, Guipúzcoa, and Vizcaya with respect due to their 
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individual characteristics.”26 He listed these points that proved to be a major argument for 
reform with these separate nationality political parties. Moreover, given the number of 
terrorist attacks caused by ETA after the death of Franco, the PNV had to step in to 
resolve any conflicts between the government and the Basques. The political conflict 
between the central government and the Basque region became a central theme in the 
development of the new Constitution.  
Later that day, Manual Fraga addressed his fellow deputies about the future 
Constitution. He first mentioned collaboration with other political parties but in exchange 
to not bring up the past such as the Spanish Civil War. He proclaimed, “We consider ... of 
very little use for Spain to debate what has already happened and, moreover, to 
irresponsibly open the old wounds of a century long civil war.”27 During the transition, 
the AP was an example of a party that avoided the crimes committed by the Nationalists 
during and after the Spanish Civil War. They wanted to avoid any confrontations over the 
past. However, Fraga wanted a true Constitution that attracted the interests for all and that 
called for a pluralist democracy.28  
The last major party to speak to the Congress that day was the Democratic Center 
Party. The UCD representative Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, Suárez’s successor and future 
prime minister of the government, called for a draft of a new constitution that would have 
the consensus of all political parties represented in the Congress and of all Spaniards.29 
He stated, “a Constitution that institutionalizes a structure of public freedoms, 
jurisdictionally guaranteed, whose practice has no limit than to respect the Constitution, 
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and does not consent with more obstructions…to defend society against violence…”30 
The UCD was the political party with the most seats in the Congress of Deputies and 
their policy on the Constitution was a strong democratic institution with judicial oversight 
over freedoms. Calvo-Sotelo’s statement targeted individuals and organizations that have 
used violence since Franco’s death such as ETA. The Spanish political leaders’ 
constitutional debates provided ideas of what the Constitution would address such as 
regional autonomy and basic freedoms. 
October 1977: The Amnesty Law and the Moncloa Pacts 
 On October 14, 1977, the Spanish parliament passed a significant bill on political 
amnesty. According to the Congress of Deputies records, Secretary José Luis Ruiz-
Navarro of the UCD stated that the proposed amnesty law would cover political crimes 
between December 15, 1976 and June 15, 1977.31 The bill covered the demands for 
autonomy and the reestablishment of public freedoms while the law extended amnesty up 
to October 6, 1977.32 According to Article 10 of the bill, “The competent judicial 
authority shall immediately order the liberty of the beneficiaries of the amnesty to be 
found in prison and shall waive search and arrest warrants for those who have been 
declared in default.”33 The amnesty put forth a complete institutional change with the 
judiciary’s power in the end of political crimes. When it was passed by the Congress of 
Deputies, the parties involved in the creation of the bill included: the UCD, the PSOE, the 
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PCE, Minoria Vasca (Basque Minority) and Minoria Catalana (Catalan Minority), 
Grupo Mixto (Mixed Group) and Socialistas de Catalonia (Socialists of Catalonia).34  
 The editors of El País reported on the new amnesty law and stated that, “…most 
of the parliamentary groups were in favor of the signing of reconciliation, which means 
amnesty, only two deputies voted against it - one of them, the former captain Julio 
Busquets - and the maximum block of the total of eighteen abstentions corresponded to 
the Popular Alliance. In the Senate, there were no votes against [the amnesty], and only 
six abstentions…”35 The votes greatly favored amnesty of political crimes but Manuel 
Fraga ordered the AP to boycott the meetings.36 The editors of El País wrote, “...the most 
significant intervention against the proposed amnesty law came from Popular 
Alliance...”37  In the Congress, the AP had abstained since the political prisoners tended 
to be leftists that opposed Francoists. The AP opposed the political parties of the 
democratic center and far left over political amnesty in 1977.  
 Michael Richards best explained the historical significance of the 1977 Amnesty 
Law. He states that this amnesty law wiped the slate for all political opposition since 
1936 when the Civil War began.38 Furthermore, he argued that,  
…opposing the dictatorship based on democratic conscience was in effect equated 
with the institutional violence of the military regime…Unusually in the Spanish 
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case, it came some four decades after the end of the war, an intervening period 
which saw repressive erasure of memory…and a humiliating silence…followed 
by another two decades of rebuffed calls for reconciliation.39  
 
The Amnesty Law of 1977 was a continued act of reconciliation between the two 
opposing political forces.  
 On October 25, 1977, the Moncloa Pacts were agreed by the political leaders of 
Spain. The pact was a negotiated solution to the economic recession and the lack of 
policy since the transition began.40 According to Preston, the pact dealt with the response 
to terrorism, inflation, unemployment, and trade.41 Furthermore, Julián Casanova 
summarized that the pact was, “…the acceptance by the forces of the left of a policy of 
moderation and wage freezes to put a brake on inflation in exchange for a series of 
promises to initiate fiscal, legal, institutional and social reforms.”42 The Moncloa Pacts 
were a consensus that benefited almost all of the major political parties. Juan Linz and 
Alfred Stepan called the Moncloa Pacts a political pact where Suárez invited all the major 
political parties to the presidential home for negotiations.43 Furthermore, the editors of 
Cambio 16 wrote, “The pact…could finally be signed in the Moncloa, after four months 
in which the first democratic government of Adolfo Suárez walked carefully without 
daring to get involved in the current economic situation. The pact, obviously, is not good, 
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but neither is it bad. It is simply unavoidable.”44  Cambio 16’s editorial explained that the 
signing was good because it was a successful compromise between all the major political 
parties.45 For example, Preston argues, “The Moncloa Pact was in many respects the 
culmination of the policies of moderation and self-sacrifice pursued by both the Socialists 
and Communists throughout the transition period.”46 The Suárez administration led and 
pushed for compromise. 
This consensus by the Moncloa Pacts, after the Amnesty Law of 1977, showed 
that the political leaders needed to adopt reconciliation within Spanish politics. The 
journalist Federico Abascal Gasset, who worked for Cuadernos para el Diálogo, wrote, 
“The agreements of the Moncloa...will serve Mr. Suárez to prove if he knows how to 
govern a country.”47 The Moncloa Pacts was another political victory for Suárez and the 
UCD. The Moncloa agreements on the economy proved to be part of the overall idea of 
democratic consensus and Suárez demonstrated that he was the right man to steer Spain 
towards democracy. As Javier Tusell argued, “The Moncloa Pacts came to represent in 
socio-economic terms an attitude parallel to that of the political consensus achieved in the 
electoral law and the amnesty law.”48  The pacts were an example of the Spanish model 
for democratic transitions. Still, not everyone was on board. Paloma Aguilar claims that 
only the AP refused to sign the Moncloa Pacts.49  
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The following day on October 26, 1977, unions such as the UGT, CCOO, and the 
Confederacion Española de Organizaciones Empresariales, were supposed to participate 
in the negotiations of the Moncloa Pacts.50 According to Casanova, the pacts, “…met two 
of the main objectives fairly quickly: a marked fall in foreign deficit and the swift 
reduction of inflation to 16%. However, unemployment was still rising…Without the 
participation of the trade unions, which had been excluded from the negotiation, and with 
no body set up to oversee the promises, many of them were shelved until better times 
came along…”51 The Moncloa Pacts were agreements debated by political leaders within 
Madrid that decided where the Spanish economy would advance. Nonetheless, Paul 
Preston argues that the left viewed the Moncloa Pacts as a “…necessary evil.”52 While 
the pact was not perfect, it served as a policy that embraced compromise. Overall, 
October 1977 served as a significant month towards the creation of a new constitution 
because of the democratic process explored through political and economic reforms.  
Constitutional Debates: Federalism vs. Autonomy  
 The debates on regional autonomy was the role of Madrid versus the regions 
outside of Castile. Galicia, Catalonia, and the Basque Country were three of the principal 
areas in Spain that wanted political autonomy. During the dictatorship, Franco and his 
supporters were vehemently against the complete autonomy of regions and nationalities 
outside of the center (Castile). The political scientist Josep M. Colomer has argued that 
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the conservatives of the AP wanted to maintain a unitary state whereas the Catalan 
Democratic Convergence (CDC) and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) favored the 
creation of institutions within their communities.53 The UCD led the Spanish government 
in solving this dilemma of regional autonomy versus a continuation of centralization. 
Furthermore, Linz and Stepan argued, “…when Spain began its transition, the variable 
that potentially presented the most dangerous complication for both democratic transition 
and democratic consolidation was stateness…The most important indicator was the 
terrorist violence of the nationalist Basque organization ETA.”54 ETA, and other terrorist 
groups, had a massive influence in the debates over regional autonomy.  
On January 19, 1978, the Senate debated on the topic of autonomy in the creation 
of a new constitution. Alberto Armas Garcia, a member of the Socialist Party and Senator 
representing Tenerife, began his address with a statement, “It is evident that the country 
[Spain] has a longing for regional life; even in areas without an autonomous tradition 
there had been mass movements that would have to be blind and deaf to not interpret.”55 
The ultimate pursuit for the socialists was for a political reform that granted autonomy to 
all regions of Spain. Armas Garcia called for a conception of a federalist system within 
Spain that was a union of all nationalities.56 
 The socialists promoted a federalist system when González and Guerra wrote 
about this topic in their essays. They declared that the new Constitution should confirm a 
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federalist system that guaranteed autonomy for all the people of Spain because they can 
create their own institutions.57 The idea of autonomy opposed Francoism’s ideal of a 
centralized state ruled by an authoritarian dictator. For the socialists, their policy was for 
regions and nationalities within Spain to gain some freedoms. Furthermore, they argued, 
“…This decentralization process and the empowerment of autonomies is perfectly 
consistent with the essence of Socialism, since it supposes a deepening of the concept of 
democracy, an objective that is identified with that of Socialism itself.”58 The socialists 
campaigned for autonomy as part of a democratic socialist ideology that would take 
Spain towards political consensus. 
  In addition, the Catalonia Senator from Barcelona, Josep Benet Morell, of the 
Grupo Entesa dels Catalans, a leftist party, addressed the Senate on the autonomy of 
Catalonia and his concerns on the current administration. He stated, “It is necessary that 
the government had a pre-autonomy policy. This is necessary because, in the question of 
the autonomies, it is now producing illusions and confusions that can have severe 
negative consequences.”59 Much of the problems with regional conflict was mainly with 
the Basque radicals in ETA and not with Catalan nationalism. The political scientist 
Omar Encarnación argues, “The Catalans presented an ideal scenario for the introduction 
of regional home rule because…in contrast to the Basque Country, violence is not an 
important component of Catalan nationalism.”60 The Catalans proved to be valuable on 
the debate towards a federalist Spanish state. This question and debate on regional 
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political autonomy proved to be important because the Constitutional debates continued 
in 1978.  
The 9th Spanish Communist Party Congress: April 19-23, 1978 
 On April 20, 1978, the Communist Party held their party congress in Madrid. It 
was the first congress for the PCE to legally be allowed in Spain since 1932.61 The 
congress was a massive event for the communists that returned to Spain. It took place 
slightly after the 47th anniversary of the founding of the Second Republic. On April 16, 
1978, Dolores Ibarruri, the lifetime president of the PCE, wrote a declaration published 
by El País about this historic occasion for the communists. She wrote about the struggle 
of the communists after almost forty years of exile, persecution, and having a clandestine 
life before the legalization in 1977.62 Ibarruri later proclaimed in her published 
declaration that, “Our Communist Party is a revolutionary Marxist party, democratic, in 
solidarity with all the peoples, movements and parties that fight for their national 
liberation and for socialism...I trust that in the IX Congress…our party will be 
strengthened.”63 Similar to the socialists during the 27th Congress in Madrid the previous 
year, the communists came together in triumph for the 9th Congress. 
 On April 20, 1978, El País’s journalists Joaquín Prieto, Sebastian García, and 
Soledad Gallego-Díaz reported that more than 2000 people (1500 of them were 
delegates) arrived for the inauguration of the 9th Congress of the Communist Party that 
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took place April 19.64 On that day, Santiago Carrillo, still the Secretary General of the 
PCE, gave a speech to the 9th Congress. On the draft of the new Constitution, he told his 
fellow colleagues and party members that, “It is necessary to start with reality: no party 
has the strength to impose a text of his onto others. Perhaps this is a guarantee that this 
Constitution will last longer than others and with it the democratic system.”65  He thought 
that the consensus and lack of one party dominating the other parties could be a good sign 
that this Constitution would sustain democracy for a long time.  
 Carrillo promoted the Communist Party’s plans for a Constitution that satisfies 
the party and the workers. He argued, “We have proposed in the Cortes to reach an 
agreement to have a Constitution before the summer...We estimate that with the current 
text it is possible to carry out profound transformations of structure the day that a 
majority is prepared to carry them out.”66 The PCE had become part of the democratic 
process because they negotiated with their opponents. Still, the communists demanded 
that changes be made during this historic time of creating a new constitution that worked. 
As Carrillo noted, “Once the Constitution was approved, a new Electoral Law and 
perhaps some other complementary one of importance, the Constituent Cortes would 
have to dissolve to raise new general elections in order to choose ordinary Courts, in 
conditions of freedom and clearer than those that existed on June 15 from last year.”67 He 
argued that the new Constitution’s implementation had to improve the next elections for 
the betterment of the Communist Party and the nation. 
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The 1978 Constitution Drafted and Approved 
 The 1978 Constitution was a joint creation by a constitutional drafting committee 
that had men from separate political parties. It was a consensus that also learned from the 
mistakes made by the Second Republic’s Constitution. The Constitution had a small 
committee to draft it except the Basques were not invited in the constitutional 
negotiations within the small committee. The reason for a small committee was that the 
decision-making process was much easier with a small group than a large group.68 They 
each represented interests of their political party but having a small group increased the 
chance of swift compromise. The 1978 Constitution was lengthy and according to Tusell,   
…the Constitution had to be lengthy because the left insisted on an extensive 
enumeration of rights and intentions…The draft constitution was written by a 
commission of seven people: three of the center, one socialist, one communist, 
one Catalan nationalist, and a representative of the right….in March 1978, shortly 
before the text was completed, the socialists withdrew from the commission. 
Later, the right-wing members were on the point of doing the same, but on neither 
occasion, was the fundamental consensus of the group under any real threat.69 
 
The plan included a Catalan nationalist furthering the idea of a Spain that was a federalist 
system of autonomous provinces and a process of decentralization. 
 As Prime Minister of Spain, Suárez emphasized the importance of consensus. For 
example, in a speech given to the Congress of Deputies on April 5, 1978, he addressed to 
lawmakers and Spaniards,  
…during a constitutional process, the Government must limit the reach of its 
options maintaining the level of dissent at levels which are not substantial, 
because that is the only way to avoid what would be the gravest danger to the 
body politic: the nonexistence of a radical harmony in the country, at its roots, 
concerning the basic elements of national coexistence. This transitory situation, 
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characteristic of all constituent periods, conditions all aspects of political 
action…And the Constitution, as an expression of national harmony, must be 
obtained by consensus, for which it is necessary to consider the diverse political 
forces now present.70 
 
As Linz and Stephan have claimed, the Suárez administration adopted a “free 
constitution-making formula”71 or a formula where the consensual, instead of the 
majority, drafted the Constitution.72 Suárez and the UCD were the majority but they 
chose not to dominate the drafting of the new Constitution. The diverse group of civilians 
from separate political parties in the committee represented the UCD’s policy of 
consensus in the development of the new Constitution.  
 The text of the Constitution covered prominent issues that plagued the transition 
up to this point. For example, the Spanish Constitution’s preamble guaranteed the rights 
of Spaniards and the Constitution would protect their rights along with their culture, 
traditions, languages, and institution.73 The Preliminary Part, Section 1, proclaimed that 
Spain would be a social and democratic State under the rule of law that valued 
democratic values, National Sovereignty, and the democratic system would be a 
Parliamentary monarchy.74 The political system established itself due to the influence of 
the UCD and PSOE but also in the agreement to allow autonomy for regions. Sections 2 
and 3 recognizes the nationalities and regions for their rights to self-government and that 
while Castilian would continue to be the official language of Spain, the other Spanish 
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languages would also be officially recognized within each region’s autonomy.75 It was 
clear that the Catalonians represented the push for self-government within each region 
and nationality. While King Juan Carlos’s royalty had to be respected, the compromised 
agreements ended the old centralized government dominated from Madrid. 
 Most importantly, freedom of expression was central to the completion of the 
transition to democracy. In Part 1, chapter 1, section 20, the Constitution listed the rights 
of free expression. They included, “the right to freely express and spread thoughts, ideas 
and opinions through words, in writing or by any other means of reproduction; the right 
to literary, artistic, scientific and technical production and creation; the right to academic 
freedom; the right to freely communicate or receive truthful information…”76 The 
fundamental right of Spaniards to have freedom of expression legally destroyed a large 
aspect of Francoism. Spain returned to the core liberal values that had disappeared for 
almost forty years. 
 Lastly, the continuation of two houses on the Spanish parliament was a 
fundamental lesson learned since the days of the Second Republic. Part III, Chapter 1 of 
the Constitution addressed the Houses of Parliament. The Cortes Generales (Congress) 
would have two houses: the Congress of Deputies and the Senate and that they would be 
inviolable or would never be infringed based on the protections by the Constitution.77 
Richard Gunther argued that the committee members understood that resentment, while 
drafting a constitution, could backfire because of the consequences that could lead to 
instability within the state, collapse of the state, and violence such as what occurred in the 
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1930s.78 Consensus meant the inclusion of opposing sides and this political strategy was a 
common theme with the Spanish transition to democracy. 
 On October 31, 1978, the Constitution was approved by the Cortes. According to 
the reports by Cambio 16, out of 598 Senators and Deputies, 551 favored the new 
Constitution, 11 were against it, and 22 abstained.79 Those that abstained included the 
PNV while a member of the AP was not entirely on board with approving it.80 Before the 
vote, on October 30, El País was targeted by a terrorist attack plotted by a Far-right 
group. Three employees of El País were gravely injured by a letter bomb.81 Other 
newspapers reported the terrorist attack and the two chambers voting for the referendum 
on the Constitution. The conservative newspaper Ya labeled it as “Terrorism against 
liberty.”82 Moreover, the editors of El Socialista denounced the terrorist attack and stated, 
“despite the bombs, the Spanish Constitution of the new democracy is already in the 
street: In the hands of the people.”83 The next step of the constitutional process was the 
citizens to vote for the referendum of the new Constitution. 
 On December 6, 1978, Spaniards went to the polls to vote for or against the 
Constitution. The political parties and news media made persuasive arguments for or 
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against the ratification. In an editorial in Cambio 16, Juan Tomás de Salas argued to vote 
yes to the Constitution. He stated,  
If…the dictatorship had fallen instead of placidly vanishing, the Spaniards would 
probably have suffered much more, but the image of the previous regime would 
have been shattered forever. The traumatic change of regime would have allowed 
us to know in detail the system of widespread corruption that established and 
maintained Francoism for so many years by these lands…Vote YES on December 
6 to bet that we are a people capable of living free and in peace.84 
 
Tomás’s persuasive article centered on the past and current state of Spain such as the 
Franco regime fading instead of collapsing right away. For Tomás, voting yes was the 
right choice for peace and stability instead of misery from the long dictatorship. The 
Constitution was overwhelmingly voted by Spaniards. The editors of El País reported 
that 87.16% of the voters favored the ratification of the Constitution.85 However, the 
turnout for the vote was low because of the low voter participation in the Basque region 
when the PNV abstained from voting.86 The political scientist Diego Muro states that the 
PNV’s supporters followed the commands of the party to abstain because the PNV felt 
that it was an opportunity to become the number one leader of the Basque nationalist 
movement.87  
 There was a massive wave of optimism within the Democratic Center and the 
Socialist parties. El País reported that the Secretary General of the UCD, Rafael Arias 
Salgado, “…was not overly concerned about the abstention rate... “This Constitution is 
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going to be approved by more than 70% of the voters and that is a magnificent result,” he 
said. Mr. Arias Salgado pointed out that the abstention rate had not been high in the 
Basque Country...”88 Furthermore, Alfonso Guerra, the second in command of the PSOE, 
told El País, “To obtain a percentage of voting superior to the 60% is already a triumph. I 
do not think anyone has to be nervous about abstention figures.”89 Both Guerra and 
Salgado maintained that the ratification of the Constitution would pass successfully.  
 The Socialist Party campaigned for the ratification of the Constitution in the 
month of November and early December. On the December 10, 1978 issue of El 
Socialista, there was a declaration from the Executive Commission of the PSOE. They 
declared, “The citizens from all the cities of Spain have overwhelmingly approved the 
new constitution. On top of violent terrorism, the pressures from the extreme right, and 
all the attempts to destabilize the democratic process, the people demonstrated a clear and 
overwhelming will for coexistence between peace and liberty.”90 The optimism of the 
PSOE and the UCD culminated with the signature of King Juan Carlos on December 26 
when the Constitution of 1978 became the official document that Spain had become a 
democratic nation.  
 Concomitantly, the Communist Party’s first weekly issue of Mundo Obrero, the 
official Spanish Communist publication that was reinstated after the PCE was legalized, 
covered the ratification of the 1978 Constitution. The communists were happy that the 
ratification went well but they knew they had work to do. In an article written by 
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Fernando Salgado, he argued that, “Despite the giant step of approval of the 
constitutional text, the transition between the dictatorship and a democratic system has 
not ended ... To put it in the words of Santiago Carrillo, “The approval of the Constitution 
does not close, more than formally, the constitutional period.”’91 Salgado, as a member 
of the PCE, called for the party to lead in continued reform over the structures of the state 
and the economy.92 Still, the policy of consensus with the drafting, debates, and 
ratification of the 1978 Constitution proved that reconciliation from the past tragedies 
was the correct balance in transitioning Spain into a democratic state. 
Conclusion 
 Victor Ferreres Comella summed up the trials, tribulations, and the triumph of the 
1978 Constitution. He claims,  
When read against the background of Spain’s troubled constitutional history, the 
text of 1978 is a great achievement. This Constitution has laid down the 
foundations for a democratic system that is committed to the rule of law and 
fundamental rights…The secret of the Constitution lies in the conciliatory spirit 
with which it was written. Consenso was the magic word that was in everyone’s 
mouth at the constitutional stage…A collective resolution was made that never 
again should a democratic political order collapse as the Second Republic did in 
1936.93 
 
The 1978 Constitution began with the successful elections from June 1977 and 
culminated in the Constitutional debates within the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. 
The Moncloa Pacts was Suárez’s achievement in inviting party leaders over economic 
problems in Spain. The Moncloa Pacts represented the strategy for the achievement of 
consensus in a divided Spain. The UCD and the PSOE led this idea even though the 
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PSOE initially called for a democratic rupture. The Amnesty Law of October 1977 
continued the growing trust between the left and the moderates.   
Political leaders of the democratic left and right (except for the PNV and 
Basques), as well as most Spaniards, voted for the ratification of the 1978 Constitution. 
The vote indicated that Spaniards wanted the nation to transition to democracy. The 
consensus in the creation of the Constitution was done by Spanish political leaders and 
not the military. There was not a push by the majority for another authoritarian dictator 
nor for the continuation of the fascist tendencies of Francoism. The greatest achievement 
of the 1978 Constitution was as mentioned by Comella: the lessons from history. Spanish 
politicians learned from the mistakes from previous attempts of consolidating democracy 
in Spain, especially from the Second Republic. Spanish nationalities and regions were 
granted regional autonomy and the Catalans were part of the creation of the 1978 






























Chapter 3: The Rise and Victory of the Spanish Socialist Party: 1979-1982 
  
This chapter is an analysis of the PSOE’s (Spanish Socialist Party) success in the 
1982 elections, the fall of the UCD (Democratic Center Party), and the consolidation for 
democracy after the ratification of the 1978 Constitution. I argue that the reason for the 
Socialist Party’s success was the decision by Felipe González, and other leaders of the 
party to exclude the term Marxism on their party platform. I address the following 
questions: Why did the Socialist Party forgo Marxism and how did the UCD’s victory in 
the spring 1979 elections push for the socialists to go for a moderate approach? Why was 
1979 a pivotal year for the socialists in Spanish politics? What caused Adolfo Suárez and 
the UCD to lose approval with Spaniards even after the successful ratification of the 1978 
Constitution? Lastly, what was the political impact of the attempted coup d’état on 
Spanish politics? 
 A significant aspect of the Spanish transition to democracy was the popularity of 
the UCD. Adolfo Suárez’s leadership brought political amnesty for most political 
prisoners and exiles that opposed Franco. Moreover, the 1978 Constitution had a 
successful ratification process that had an overwhelming majority in the Cortes (the 
Spanish parliament) and from the population. The Socialist Party was in second place in 
the 1977 elections and again in the 1979 elections. However, the socialists shifted 
politically under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez and Alfonso Guerra. Since the PSOE 
became legal again, the socialists had ideological debates within their party about 
Marxism. The Marxist question plagued the PSOE. Ultimately, the PSOE succeeded in 





maintained power from 1982 to 1996. The PSOE benefitted from the UCD’s failures 
under Suárez’s and during Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo’s time as prime minister. However, the 
PSOE emerged as a moderate party of the left that was anti-authoritarian with a 
commitment to liberal democracy. 
 I analyze the publications of the Socialist Party, including essays from Felipe 
González and Alfonso Guerra. The socialists had several publications from their leaders. 
Furthermore, I analyze the Spanish parliamentary records, the U.S. State Department 
Embassy reports from Madrid, and newspapers and magazines including the party’s 
newspaper, El Socialista. Other newspaper publications include: El País, Cambio 16, 
Diario 16, and Mundo Obrero, the PCE’s (Communist Party) official publication. 
Moreover, I examine the PSOE’s 29th Congress from 1981. This chapter concerns the 
period following the ratification of the 1978 Constitution, a period that also included 
terrorist attacks by ETA and GRAPO. 
The PSOE and the Marxist Question 
 In 1977, González and Guerra published an essay titled, “El Socialismo de 
nuestro tiempo” (Socialism in Our Time). They wrote that “Marxism is not a dogma, it is 
not a sect, but it is a method of analysis of history and reality…”1 They believed that 
socialists in Spain treated Marxism as an absolute dogma. They rejected economic 
determinism2 and criticized the Soviet Union. In a scathing critique of the USSR, they 
wrote,  
                                                          
1 Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra were coauthors of the book; P.S.O.E. Alfonso Guerra was 
secretary of the press for the PSOE Executive Commission who later became Vice Secretary General of the 
PSOE under Felipe González. Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra, Partido Socialista Obero Español 






The deviations of Marxism have created a false image of the socialist project. In 
the Soviet Union, Marxism has transformed into an antithesis, contradicting itself. 
It once criticized a dominant ideology [capitalism] has now converted into a 
dominant ideology, an ideology of the State, and an ideology of the Party 
[Communist Party]. The suppression of freedom on its citizens has created a new 
form of oppression…All the political regimes that call themselves socialist are 
dictatorships like all the democracies are capitalists. There is… no political 
regime that unites the two conditions that define our thoughts: socialism and 
democracy.3 
 
This statement by González and Guerra challenged the Communist Party’s ideals. The 
criticism towards the USSR was that they suppressed their citizens. From these 
statements, they called for democratic socialism and a return to the democratic history 
from the Second Republic. For both men, the question was: should Marxism be part of 
the PSOE platform in post-Franco Spain? The PSOE’s goal was to win elections and 
Marxism created a dilemma because it was a problematic word. 
The 1979 Elections 
 The March 1, 1979 elections were another victory for the Democratic Center 
Party. It was the first election since the ratification of the 1978 Constitution. This election 
had 350 deputies and 208 senators running for congress.4 Julián Casanova concluded that 
the election, “…made no essential difference to the Spanish political map. The UCD won 
again…and the PSOE…established itself as the main opposition force and only 
alternative to government.”5 The Socialist Party remained in second. The editors of El 
País wrote that, “…yesterday's election clearly reflects the typical splitting of the left, in 
this case severely tinged with regionalism or nationalism. Thus, the Spanish Socialist 
                                                          
3 Ibid., p. 27. 
4 The number of seats in the Congress of Deputies were 350 seats and the Senate had 208 seats. 
“Hoy, las primeras elecciones generales tras la aprobación de Constitución,” El País, March 1, 1979, p. 11-
12, http://elpais.com/diario/1979/03/01/portada/289090806_850215.html (accessed March 14, 2017). 
5 Julián Casanova and Carlos Gil Andrés, Twentieth-Century Spain: A History, trans. Martin 





Workers Party…which has maintained its positions for two years, has seen its best 
expectations cut by the objectively socialist vote of the electorate, which has largely 
preferred to vote as regionalist.”6 The socialists’ problems with defeating the UCD were 
the divisions within the party. For example, as the historian Paul Preston argued, “In the 
PSOE’s southern stronghold, votes were lost to the recently created Partido Socialista de 
Andalucía…”7 The socialists’ divisions by region was a factor and a continual problem as 
to why they could not get a majority in the Cortes. 
 Cambio 16’s report on the election results summed up with a headline that labeled 
the election night as Gonzalez’s most depressing night.8 Juan Tomás de Salas, a journalist 
for Cambio 16, wrote that, “If the definitive figures confirm it, the results of the March 
elections do not represent as much of a victory for President Suárez but more as a 
psychological defeat for the Socialists...If the Socialists had not made too many illusions 
of victory…they would not seem to have many reasons to feel defrauded.”9 The PSOE 
underestimated the Spaniards attraction to the UCD’s moderate positions. For González 
and the PSOE, the election was a devastating loss but a turning point in its political 
history. Concomitantly, El Socialista’s headline expressed damage control from the 
senate seats gained by the PSOE. The editors of El Socialista claimed that, “When we 
thought that the language and the methods that contributed so much to keeping the 
wounds of civil discords open, our present political campaign has been used by the 
                                                          
6 “UCD, en solitario,” Editorial, El País, March 2, 1979, 
http://elpais.com/diario/1979/03/02/opinion/289177203_850215.html (accessed March 14, 2017). 
7 Paul Preston, Triumph of Democracy in Spain (New York: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1986), p. 153. 
8 “Aunque Suárez no barrio: La noche mas triste de Felipe González,” Cambio 16, March 11, 
1979, Library of Congress, Microfilm, Nos. 370-394, Madrid, January 7-13, 1979 thru June 24, 1979, Shelf 
No. (0)83/703. 





Spanish nation to exhibit its traditional vices again.”10 Much of the concern was that 
Suárez and the UCD benefitted from the success of the 1978 Constitution’s ratification. 
 Why did the Socialist Party lose the March 1979 elections? One reason was 
Suárez’s last appeal to Spaniards the night before the election through a televised address. 
El País summarized Suárez’s speech on TVE and he attacked the PSOE stating,  
“We cannot believe in the centrist moderation of electoral propaganda,” because 
the program of the XXVII Congress, for example, defends free abortion and, 
moreover, it would be subsidized by the taxpayer; the disappearance of religious 
education advocates a path that leads to a collectivist and self-managed economy. 
In other manifestations, [the PSOE] have raised the dissolution of those who 
nominate repressive bodies of the State and demanding responsibilities or publicly 
advising the negotiations with ETA.11 
 
The speech made a massive impact to undecided voters as Suárez appealed to a far more 
social conservative position on abortion and religious freedom.12 In Cambio 16’s article 
“Por qué no ganó el PSOE” (Why did the PSOE not win), they quoted Julio Feo, a 
Spanish socialist, and Feo argued that Suárez’s appearance on television the night before 
the election, “...behaved demagogically and provoked the vote of fear.”13 The socialists 
had a traumatic defeat14 and underestimated Suárez’s moderate positions that went 
against the PSOE’s history. Social issues such as abortion were a key issue that swayed 
voters towards the UCD over the socialists.  
                                                          
10 “Por decision del pueblo: El PSOE Se Consolida,” El Socialista, March 4, 1979, Library of 
Congress, Microfilm, Madrid, January 1, 1979 thru December 31, 1979, Shelf No. NP2849, Reel No. 2168. 
11 “Felipe González afirmó que el PSOE puede gobernar y Suárez pidió la mayoría parlamentaria,” 
El País, February 28, 1979, http://elpais.com/diario/1979/02/28/espana/289004417_850215.html (accessed 
March 16, 2017). 
12 Preston, Triumph of Democracy in Spain, p. 153, see also: Santos Juliá, “Ideological Conversion 
of PSOE Leaders,” in Frances Lannon and Paul Preston, eds, Élites and Power in Twentieth-Century Spain: 
Essays in Honour of Sir Raymond Carr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 278. 
13 “Por qué no ganó el PSOE,” Cambio 16, March 18, 1979, see also: Preston, Triumph of 
Democracy in Spain, p. 153. 





The Communist Party increased their results by only 1 percent in 1979.15 In an 
editorial from Mundo Obrero, the editors argued, “Democracy, which began to be 
constructed on June 15, 1977, is still imperfect, since when fixing its laws, except when 
the Communists intervened, the Constitution, for example, the bourgeoisie’s interests 
prevailed.”16 The communists were not content and the election results disappointed 
them. The editors of Mundo Obrero added that, “The possibility of a policy driven by 
communists, socialists, and other democratic currents that countered the tendencies to 
govern law by the UCD is real.”17 The communists still believed that the Spanish voters 
would turn to a more leftist attitude against the UCD’s more moderate positions. 
However, Preston claimed that the decline in membership had to do with the leadership 
that was once exiled such as Santiago Carrillo because these men and women still had 
“…Stalinist habits.”18  
The Socialist Party’s 28th Congress: The Marxist Question Revisited 
 The Socialist Party’s 28th Congress led to a debate on whether it would continue 
to use Marxism in their party platform. The historian Santos Juliá argued that the 1979 
elections and the victory of the UCD forced González to limit Marxism as a slogan for 
the party and that the leaders needed to organize another party congress to solve this 
problem.19 Before the congress, González made a statement in an interview to El 
Socialista about the 28th Congress of the PSOE. He argued that, “Marxist analysis cannot 
lead to dogmatization, in my opinion, in such a way that anyone who does not feel 
                                                          
15 Javier Tusell, Spain: From Democracy to Dictatorship, 1939 to the Present, trans. Rosemary 
Clark (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2007), p. 304. 
16 “Cuando dos y dos no son cuatro,” Editorial, Mundo Obrero, March 8-14, 1979. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Paul Preston, Triumph of Democracy in Spain, p. 153. 
19 Santos Juliá, “Ideological Conversion of PSOE Leaders,” in Élites and Power in Twentieth-





Marxist, or who does not have a Marxist origin, or who does not know Marx, does not 
feel comfortable in the party.”20 For González, before the congress, the main reason for 
the PSOE to let go of dogmatic worship of Marxism was because of the March 1979 
election results. As the political scientist Paul Kennedy stated, the disappointing results 
from the March 1979 elections strengthened González’s resolve to take on the Socialist 
Party’s self-defined idea of Marxism and of his own authority within the party.21  
The debate took over the 28th congress on May 17 to May 20, 1979. The political 
scientist Monica Mendez-Lago claimed, “The Marxist definition of the party and the 
strict definition of the working class were perceived as the main impediment to further 
electoral growth. In fact, Felipe González had already announced his intention to ask the 
party to remove the term ‘Marxist’ from the PSOE programe in May 1978.”22 The 28th 
congress became a transitional period in the history of the PSOE because of this debate 
González brought up as a major factor to the future of the party. 
During the 28th congress,  two camps divided the party: the oficialistas (officials) 
or felipistas (named after Felipe González) and the criticos (critics).23 The ideological 
debate dominated most of the congress. El País reported that,  
The delegates, more than a thousand, made clear from the first moment their 
majority desire was not to suppress the Marxist definition of the PSOE and 
applauded strongly how much Karl Marx was mentioned. Enrique Tierno Galván, 
mayor of Madrid and honorary president of the party, reaped great applause 
saying that the PSOE should not abandon any ideological aspect...Felipe 
González...delivered a speech for an hour and a half and called for the 28th 
Congress of the PSOE to assume, with critical spirit, the Marxist experience and 
                                                          
20 “XXVIII Congreso y centenario del PSOE: Felipe González hace balance,” El Socialista, May 
13, 1979. 
21 Paul Kennedy, The Spanish Socialist Party and the Moderisation of Spain (New York and 
Manchester UK: Manchester University Press, 2013), p. 29. 
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that of all socialists. He raised applause only when he quoted Pablo Iglesias and 
Marx and when he asked for less verbalism and more depth in the change.24 
 
Enrique Tierno Galván was a loyal socialist that wanted the socialists to continue to use 
Marxism in their party platform. Galván and González’s speeches divided the congress. 
The 28th Congress started with a public schism of Marxism as an ideology within the 
socialist leadership. The PSOE was at a cross roads of which direction the party should 
go in a post-Franco Spain. The first day showcased the inevitable conflicts between the 
moderates and the leftists of the party. González represented a less ideological approach 
to Marxism as a political ideology in the PSOE. 
González continued to challenge the party’s dogmatism of Marx as a political 
force with the socialists even though he did not denounce Marx. He said:  
At this hour, we must also pay homage to the fundamental creator of scientific 
socialism, Karl Marx, to compensate him for the attack he has received and 
receives from all the reactionaries of the Earth and to rescue him from the 
ignorance and manipulation of those who…have elevated Marxism to the altars of 
dogmatic doctrine. Against Marx and with Marx, nations have also practiced 
despotism and tyranny, fascism and totalitarianism. That is why Karl Marx 
deserves to be studied and assumed critically, without making it sacred and with 
recognition. The Socialist Party could never give up the ideas that gave it life. Nor 
could socialism assume Marx as an absolute value that marks the dividing line 
between true and false, but assuming it to himself and to all socialists means 
critically gathering his contributions to the struggle for the construction of a new 
society.25 
 
He confronted this ideological dilemma with his delegates and colleagues in the PSOE 
directly. For González, Marxism in the twentieth century connected with the complete 
worship of its ideas. The Marxist question plagued the PSOE and he believed that Marx 
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consumed the party leaders as a sacred doctrine. The congress was an ideological struggle 
on how to analyze Marxism without the need to remove the word but to move the party 
towards the center left. 
The American Embassy in Madrid reported on González’s speech to the U.S. 
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. They stated, 
Making it clear that his intention was not to "renounce" Marx, Gonzalez 
nevertheless emphasized the necessity of “modernizing the party in order to be 
able to mobilize a majority of society” (i.e., open the party to the center-left), 
because socialism cannot “assume Marx as an absolute value that makes the 
difference between truth and falsehood, between just and unjust.”26  
 
The significance of this speech transformed part of the identity of the Socialist Party. For 
González, modernizing the party meant moving on from the Marxist identity. He 
understood that his ambition to become a future prime minister of Spain had to confront 
the issue of Marxism because it was a controversial term that was unpopular with the 
voters. The voters favored moderate positions and González responded to the voters and 
wanted to influence them in the next election. 
On May 19, the leaders of the party approved a draft resolution that the PSOE 
reaffirmed its party platform as a class, of the masses, Marxist, and a federal and 
democratic party.27 Then on May 20, González resigned as Secretary General of the 
PSOE. In his resignation, González shocked his constituents in the congress.28 The 
American Embassy in Madrid summarized the events: “…The specific issue that 
                                                          
26 In this period, the American ambassador in Spain was Terence Todman, ambassador from 1978 
– 1983. The reports do not mention his name but he was the ambassador in Madrid. “The PSOE Congress: 
The First Day,” American Embassy Madrid to Secretary of State, Madrid (May 18, 1979), NACP RG 59, 
Electronic Telegrams, 1979, Central Foreign Policy Files, National Archives AAD, Document Number: 
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27 “El debale ideológico crea serios problemas a la dirección del PSOE,” El País, May 19, 1979, p. 
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precipitated the chain reaction leading to Felipe Gonzalez's refusal to run for reelection as 
PSOE First Secretary was the reaffirmation of the PSOE’s Marxist character included in 
the statement of party principles approved by the Congress during the night of May 19-
20.”29 The resignation was a bold move by González given how popular he was within 
the party. The Marxist question defined the decisions made by González as the leader of 
the PSOE. 
On June 3, 1979, the Spanish journalist José Oneto and at the time director of 
Cambio 16 said:  
Felipe González, who is not a Marxist, who does not believe that Marxism is the 
alternative of his party, who has personally had the courage to publicly declare 
that he prefers to die stabbed in Harlem, New York than to live in the Soviet 
Union, believed that the definition has left the XXVIII Congress of the 
PSOE...does not match a model of modern socialist society...and has decided to 
resign from the Secretary General of the party.30 
 
As stated before, González criticized the Soviet Union back in 1977 and understood that 
the term Marxism, had become a dogma by the leftist members of the PSOE. 
Furthermore, the editors of Cambio 16 argued that the crisis in the PSOE, “... provoked 
by modernists and radicals and the resignation of Felipe González to the Secretary 
General, threatens to divide dramatically the party of Pablo Iglesias and can endanger the 
stability of the Spanish Democratic System if...within six months Felipe González is 
again defeated.”31 The six months mentioned by Cambio 16 was a conference by the 
                                                          
29 “The PSOE Congress: The Apple of Discord,” American Embassy Madrid to Secretary of State, 
Madrid (May 23, 1979), NACP RG 59, Electronic Telegrams, 1979, Central Foreign Policy Files, National 
Archives AAD, Document Number: 1979MADRID06973, Film Number: D790237-0450, 
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PSOE that the leaders of the party decided. The following conference, the Extraordinary 
Conference, would take place in late September of 1979.32 
 Nevertheless, the compromise did not happen during the 28th Congress. Mendez-
Lago argued that, “the delegates to the Twenty-Eighth Party Congress…backed the 
criticos but at the same time expressed their wish to keep González as the PSOE’s 
General Secretary. González refused to stand for re-election…”33 González was not going 
to concede the removal of Marxism from the party. As Santos Juliá stated, the delegates 
of the party wanted González to remain the leader while simultaneously state that the 
party was Marxist.34 The delegates wanted the party to remain Marxist. For González, he 
had no choice but to resign as Secretary General. 
Angel Merino, a journalist for El Socialista, argued, “before our 28th Congress, 
the right-wing press has used the controversy surrounding the word Marxism with a 
radically different position to which the controversy holds for us...”35 Merino responded 
to the Marxism debate and the right-wing press’s attacks on the socialists as a 
vulnerability to the party and how the controversy differed from the right-wing and left-
wing press. El País’s editorial had an optimistic opinion on González’s resignation. They 
claimed that, “Felipe González won. And if in the editorial of last Sunday, we warned 
about the need for him to remain at the head of the party, today it should be added that his 
act should not be taken as abandonment, but as an active attitude of commitment to his 
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34 Santos Juliá, Ideological Conversion of PSOE Leaders,” Élites and Power in Twentieth-Century 
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party and to the country.”36 The PSOE needed González and the reformists to take drastic 
measures for the party to win the majority of the votes.  
Mundo Obrero highlighted that González told the delegates that the PSOE had to 
be socialists and not become Marxists first.37 Furthermore, Mundo Obrero reported that 
even after his resignation as Secretary General, González was still popular with the 
delegates that the delegates chanted his name.38 Ultimately, the 28th Congress was a low 
point for the party during the transition but it had to happen for the socialists to evolve. 
The congress represented the desperation of the PSOE to become the majority party and 
it provided a reevaluation of the PSOE’s platform.  
The Extraordinary Congress of the PSOE took place on September 28 and 29, 
1979. It benefitted González and his supporters for several reasons.  The journalists of El 
País: Soledad Gallego-Díaz, Joaquín Prieto, Juan Francisco Janeiro, and Sebastian 
García, reported that, “The Extraordinary Congress of the PSOE decided yesterday to 
admit “currents of opinion” in the party, as well as assuming Marxism as a method of 
analysis of reality and consider the PSOE as a “mass party…”’39 The Extraordinary 
Congress was an ideological and political compromise within the PSOE’s leadership. 
Furthermore, González and Guerra returned and became Secretary General and 
Vice-Secretary General after the compromise.40 In an interview, González responded to 
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El País that, “I fully share the ideological report approved by the congress; its content 
was already in the speech with which the 28th Congress was inaugurated” ...The 
Extraordinary Congress has been, in the judgment of the socialist leader, satisfactory.”41 
González became the winner after the Extraordinary Congress. Paul Preston argued, 
“With the entire national press and the television supporting Felipe González, it was 
perhaps inevitable that the criticos would suffer a humiliating rout. The moderates were 
victorious…”42 González’s popularity and charisma dominated the PSOE’s positions that 
overwhelmed the more left wing members of the party. Nevertheless, 1979 was a critical 
year for the PSOE. Santo Juliá argued that the PSOE matured during this critical moment 
in its history.43 In addition, Juliá claimed that the PSOE’s abandonment of Marxism was 
not just an ideological dispute but preparations for the PSOE’s threat to change Spanish 
society as part of the political system.44 While the socialists had an ideological struggle, 
the next years for the party strengthened due to the problems of the UCD and other key 
events. 
Adolfo Suárez and the decline of the UCD 
 The UCD had taken control over the Constitutional debates and was relatively 
successful until the second half of 1979. The problems for the UCD began with the 
party’s continued difficulties with ETA and within the party itself. First, on April 5, 1979, 
the opposition slammed Suárez’s announcement of his new cabinet.45 Guillermo Galeote 
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of the Socialist Party criticized the cabinet as more to the right than Suárez’s last 
administration.46 Suárez’s victory from the March elections was short lived. José Oteno 
of Cambio 16 criticized Suárez’s government. He began his column with a daubing on a 
wall in Madrid47 which read, ‘“Franco was mad: he thought he was Suárez” ... the 
development and outcome of the crisis has not only been Francoist, but Franco probably 
would have envied Mr. Suarez when it came to putting into practice that political 
juggling of El Pardo and that, on many occasions, he is diminished by the behavior of the 
Moncloa.”48 This scathing piece against Suárez’s administration was an example that the 
UCD were not as popular as they were after the March 1979 elections. 
 Second, the week of May 25 to 27, 1979 was a difficult time for Suárez.49 On 
May 25, ETA: militar assassinated a general, two colonels, and their driver two days 
before the Día de las Fuerzas Armadas (The Armed Services Day).50 Not including the 
driver, the victims were General Luis Gómez Hortigüela, leader of the Personal del 
Ejército (Army General Staff), Colonels Agustín Lasy, and Jesús Avalos Gomáriz.51 
ETA, the Basque terrorists that continued to cause problems for the government, split 
during the transition. The two sub groups were ETA:M (‘ETA militar’ who believed in 
armed struggle) and ETA:PM (‘ETA poli-milis' a more political and less violent group).52 
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The following day, GRAPO, an antifascist and leftist terrorist organization, killed eight 
and wounded fifty people, labeled as a terrorist attack, at a cafeteria in Madrid.53  
 Cambio 16 criticized Prime Minister Suárez’s response to the tragic events. Part 
of the issue stemmed from Suárez when he did not attend the funeral for the three 
military officers killed by ETA, he did not visit the Army headquarters, and he did not go 
to the Spanish parliament until that Wednesday.54 The editors of Cambio 16 specified 
their critique of Prime Minister Suárez that he, “…should have spoken to the country the 
same Saturday or at least last Sunday. A few words of security…And it is important to 
speak to the country, in Parliament, on television, and wherever it may be, as often as 
necessary, and most importantly often.”55 Much of the criticism against Suárez had taken 
a hit towards the UCD by the left and the right. Part of the politics of consensus was 
keeping the military out of the constitutional debates and at that moment, the military 
wanted answers from the Suárez administration. 
Third, these events by ETA led to the continued problem with the policies of 
regional autonomy. Suárez negotiated with the PNV over an autonomy statute with on 
July 18, 1979. According to the reports by El País, the PNV and the UCD, “…concluded 
yesterday the global agreement on the content of the Basque Statute, which was 
personally ratified by the President of the Government, Adolfo Suárez, and the president 
of the PNV, Carlos Garaicoetxea.”56 The PNV and the Euskadiko Eskerra voted and 
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helped campaign for a yes vote.57 ETA-PM accepted the statute but ETA:M did not 
accept the terms and they would continue the war.58 
While the statute was an attempt for peace between the Basque region and the 
government, the 1980 autonomous elections damaged the UCD. Andalucía had its 
autonomy referendum on February 28, 1980. 4,468,979 Andalusians voted and 54 
percent voted yes on the autonomy statute.59 The editors of Cambio 16’s called it a great 
political setback for the UCD from the Andalusians.60 The autonomy debate came from 
Article 151 of the Constitution that concerned Andalusia. As the editors of El País 
argued, “Although late, President Suárez realized the impasse that had led, at the 
constituent stage, the foolish attempt to reduce the political significance of the 
autonomies of Catalonia and the Basque Country by inventing the possibility of 
generalizing them through article 151 and of the initiative referendums.”61 Suárez was a 
hindrance to the constitutional process in Andalucía and this referendum took a major hit 
to his popularity.  
Fourth, the Basque election on March 9, 1980 was another setback for the UCD. 
The editors of El País reported,  
What some are already considering as a UCD catastrophe in the Basque Country 
happens after the adverse results in the Andalusian referendum and only eleven 
days after the elections for the Parliament of Catalonia, before which the opinion 
polls also indicate very bad prospects for the UCD. The autonomic politics of 
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President Suárez today is the target of criticisms from the opposition parties - 
notably the PSOE - and segments of the UCD itself.62 
 
The Basque elections damaged Suárez’s leadership as the UCD came in fourth place 
behind the PSOE. Furthermore, as Paul Preston argued, one poll had about fifty percent 
of the voter that voted for the UCD back in March 1979, stated they would not vote for 
the UCD again.63 The UCD began to show cracks and the PSOE exploited it. On May 21, 
1980, the PSOE passed a motion of censure against Suárez and, as El País claimed, this 
act by the PSOE, “...whose approval would lead to the fall of the Cabinet and the 
automatic appointment of Felipe González as the new President of the Government. 
Adolfo Suárez said that he considered the presentation of the vote of censure, because it 
is a mechanism provided for in the Constitution, although he attacked the PSOE for 
“showing that he lacks an alternative.”’64 Overall, these examples caused the UCD 
problems of stability that damaged the integrity of the party. 1980 was a terrible year for 
Suárez but an opportune year for the opposition. The avalanche of mistakes led to the 
eventual resignation of Suárez as Prime Minister of Spain. 
Adolfo Suárez’s Resignation, February 1981 and 23-F 
 Suárez resigned on January 29, 1981. ABC, a major Spanish conservative 
newspaper, covered the resignation of Suárez and published the transcript of his 
resignation speech on television. He said,  
I am leaving, therefore, without anyone asking me, ignoring the requests and the 
pressures with which I have been urged to remain in my position, with the 
conviction that this behavior, however little comprehensible it may seem at first 
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sight, is what I believe my country requires me in this moment...Every politician 
must have a vocation of power, a desire for continuity and duty in the framework 
of some of these principles.65 
 
Suárez’s speech was a television broadcast and his popularity was at an all-time low as he 
only had 26 percent of the population supporting him.66 Suárez gave his speech based on 
his love for Spain. However, the editors of El País reported that, “President Suárez did 
not explain yesterday's televised address about his political reasons that led him to resign 
as head of the Executive office and his party.”67 Suárez did not explain why he resigned. 
Nevertheless, his decision was a political decision because the UCD was still in power. 
El País stated the possible reasons for Suárez’s resignation. The editors 
speculated that his resignation, “…has been brought about from the so-called critical 
sector of his party and from traditional Spanish circles of the right in recent months. 
People close to the outgoing president point out that the decision is solely due to 
psychological and political exhaustion…”68 Historians and political scientists analyzed 
Suárez’s reasons for his resignation. Julián Casanova explained that, “…the determining 
factor was the internal division of the UCD, in which it was hard to separate ideological 
disputes from personal confrontations.”69 Suárez had been in power since Carlos Arias 
Navarro resigned back in July 1976 and his internal issues with the UCD had a hand in 
his decision. Paul Preston added that, “Physically and psychologically exhausted after 
leading Spain through the transition, he had little stomach for a fight with his erstwhile 
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colleagues.”70 Suárez led Spain through amnesty of political prisoners and exiles, the 
Moncloa Pacts, and the 1978 Constitution. However, his popularity within the 
government and with Spaniards declined. As Tusell claimed, “He realized his own 
limitations and that over time the popularity he had once enjoyed had dwindled.”71 Once 
Suárez’s popularity declined, he understood his reelection would be difficult.  
Nonetheless, Suárez’s decision was a historical moment in Spanish history due to 
the decisions he made with the transition. He chose to reform the political system from 
within and he did it swiftly. He included the opposition in negotiations over political 
amnesty of prisoners and exiles. The legalization of the Communist Party was a risk that 
while controversial, was vital for the democratic transition top succeed. He continued this 
policy of reconciliation and compromise with the Moncloa Pacts and the 1978 
Constitution.  
Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo became the next prime minister of Spain. He was the 
Second Deputy Prime Minister of Spain from September 1980 to Suárez’s resignation. 
The editors of Cambio 16 wrote a detailed article about “Operation Leopoldo” and about 
Calvo-Sotelo’s role in the UCD and the government. The reason why Suárez chose 
Calvo-Sotelo as his successor was,  
Worried about the deterioration of the situation, obsessed by the severe problem 
of terrorism, convinced even that Suárez himself had no choice but to name him 
the successor, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo had never dared to take the necessary step, 
or to head any palace revolution to end Adolfo Suárez. Only when, on the 
morning of January 30, the President of the Government, who had not yet told the 
country his resignation, was launching “Operation Leopoldo.”72  
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Calvo-Sotelo remained loyal to the UCD and Suárez trusted him as the next prime 
minister of Spain. As for the UCD party, Preston argued that, “…Sunday 8 
February…the Congress of UCD elected Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo as their candidate for 
the premiership. He had been reluctantly chosen merely as the candidate who provoked 
least antipathy among the various factions.”73 Calvo-Sotelo’s inauguration was to take 
place on February 23, 1981. 
 February 23 began in the Cortes with debates and the eventual inauguration of 
Calvo-Sotelo as the new prime minister. Later that day, at around 6:20 pm (1820 hours), 
according to the Congress of Deputies records,  
...after hearing in the hall some shots and shouts of "Fire, fire!" and "To the floor 
everyone!" many people armed and in uniform of the Civil Guard barged into the 
hemicycle, located in Strategic places, threatened the Presidency by force and, 
after an altercation with the First Vice-President of the Government, Lieutenant 
General Guterrez Mellado, ordered everyone to drop to the ground, with the 
sounding rattles of submachine guns. The session is interrupted.74 
 
The military far right and the last remnants of Franco formed a group called 23-F. 
Colonel Antonio Tejero led 23-F. He was in prison for seven months in November 1978 
over the Cafetería Galaxia conspiracy.75 23-F took over the Spanish parliament and 
attempted a coup d’état. Paul Preston described the coup in his biography of King Juan 
Carlos,  
At 6:23 P.M., about 320 Civil Guards under Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero arrived at 
the Cortes. Tejero jumped from the first bus, waving his pistol and shouting, ‘In 
the name of the King!’ Approximately half the Civil Guards entered the 
Cortes…Tejero loudly repeated that he was acting on the orders of the King and 
General Milans del Bosch. The Civil Guards who burst into the chamber took 
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hostage the government ministers and all of the nation’s parliamentary 
deputies…Felipe González, Alfonso Guerra, the deputy leader of the PSOE, 
Santiago Carrillo, Gutiérrez Mellado, Suárez and Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún 
were locked in a bitterly cold room where they were obliged to remain in silence 
until the following morning.76 
 
The coup was a moment of confusion as the idea was to create a state of emergency and 
23-F hoped that the King would back the military. Other conspirators included General 
Alfonso Armada and General Jaime Milans del Bosch.77 General Alfonso Armada was a 
member of the Army’s high command and General Milans del Bosch was the Captain-
General of the Valencia Military Group. 
The King had to decide since the political leaders of each major party were under 
the control of 23-F. His television address on the early morning of February 24 ordered 
23-F to step down, to surrender and to put an end of the attempted coup, and that the 
crown did not tolerate any action by the military in disrupting the democratic process and 
the ratified Constitution.78 ABC, as staunch supporters of the monarchy, published a part 
of the speech the King made to the public. He said, “The Crown, symbol of the longevity 
and unity of the country, cannot tolerate, in any way, actions or attitudes of people who 
intend to interrupt, by force, the democratic process that the Constitution voted by the 
Spanish people…”79 After the King’s speech, Lieutenant General Milans del Bosch 
ordered his troops to withdraw at Valencia, the city he and his men occupied during the 
coup.80  
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The King’s decision was the defining moment that proved that he would defend 
democracy from the military leadership that aspired to be the next Francisco Franco. As 
Cambio 16’s editorial declared, “Without King Juan Carlos, the night of February 23 
would have been the saddest for a couple of generations of Spaniards...With the courage 
and an enviable serenity, King Juan Carlos smashed an improbable coup that was about 
to triumph.”81 Shortly afterward, the coup failed due to the unity of the country’s 
politicians, the citizens, and the King’s sway of the military conspirators.  
The press from all areas of the political spectrum condemned the actions of 
Colonel Tejero and 23-F. The editors of El País reported that the King met with the 
leaders of the political parties, including Felipe González.82 They stated,  
During the meeting with Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún, Felipe González, Santiago 
Carrillo, Manuel Fraga, and Adolfo Suárez, the resigned President, the King read 
a message on the situation by the coup of Lieutenant Colonel Tejero, who, 
according to the testament of the secretary General of the PCE, “it was 
supplemented by contributions from everyone.” …González insisted that the coup 
“should force us all to reflect seriously” and he stressed the desirability of 
differentiating the action of a group of people, without involving armed 
institutions or bodies.83 
 
The Spanish parliament united and González, along with his opponents, understood the 
significance of this attempted coup.  
 On February 25, the Spanish parliament met again to continue where the congress 
left off since the attempted coup. Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, who finally became the new 
Prime Minister of Spain, gave his speech to the Congress of the Deputies. He called for 
high praise for the King and his leadership to defend democracy when the government 
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and 23-F detained the congress as hostages.84 Santiago Carrillo also praised the King’s 
actions and the unity of each political party’s defense of the Constitution and the 
democracy in a tense moment.85 González, similar to his statement to El País, told the 
congress that the nation needed to reflect on whether to consolidate or not consolidate 
democracy in Spain.86 He specified that, “When the words that transmit the ideas in a 
civil manner are replaced by submachine guns, they are silenced by submachine guns, it 
can hardly be said that democracy is beginning with strength and that it has finished a 
stage of the transition.”87 However, the impact of the failed coup in Spain showed how 
quickly the country could turn into another authoritarian state had it not been for the 
political leaderships commitment to democracy. The political scientist Paloma Aguilar 
claimed that the attempted coup showed the political parties that the military still had 
anti-democratic ideas.88 
The PSOE summarized this event as the end of any opposition to the democratic 
transition. In El Socialista, the editors stated that the darkest days of the coup d’état gave 
rise to a country that protested for democracy even while the Cortes was under control of 
the 23-F.89 Moreover, in El Socialista, the PSOE declared, “1. It’s total commitment to 
defend the constitution, democracy, and liberty for the people …2. Their demand from 
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the public powers, the security forces of the state and the armed forces…to defend the 
constitution.”90 The socialists were right because of the substantial number of protests 
Spaniards had for democracy throughout the country.91 As Preston stated, these 
demonstrations by Spaniards against 23-F’s actions by Spaniards was as if a phoenix of 
Spanish democracy rose again.92 
The Socialist Party and the 1982 Elections 
 On October 21-24, 1981, the Socialist Party had their 29th Party Congress. At the 
congress, the PSOE declared that, “The Socialist Project is defined by a radical defense 
of freedom ... That Project is identified today in Spain with the task of defense and 
development of the Constitution. We again point out that the constitutional development 
in the chapter of fundamental rights and public freedoms is incomplete.”93 The PSOE’s 
party platform became a progressive platform on improving the rights of Spaniards. Still, 
the 29th Congress did not use the word Marxism and González won his reelection as 
Secretary General by almost 100 percent of the votes.94 Thus, González united the PSOE 
and pushed for a more moderate position. 
 In 1981 and 1982, Spanish politicians had disputes over Spain’s inclusion in 
NATO. The NATO debate dominated Spanish politics and politicians argued about 
whether to join NATO. The Democratic Center Party favored joining NATO since 
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October 1978.95 The Socialist Party were against Spain joining NATO and on April 29, 
1981, González declared that Spain should stay out of NATO.96 The PSOE ran an anti-
NATO campaign while the UCD and PCE were struggling in popularity. Part of the 
PSOE’s strategy was to push for peace. For example, on November 16, 1981, there was a 
mass protest for peace, disarmament, and freedom in Madrid, specifically against Spain 
joining NATO and anti-nuclear missiles. About 250,000 people showed up and the event 
had been organized “...by more than two hundred political, trade unions, 
environmentalist, feminist and citizen associations of all kinds, which was one of the 
most important pacifist demonstrations that have been held in Europe lately.”97 At the 
march were members of the PSOE and PCE including González and Carrillo. 
 According to the journalist Karmentxu Marín of El País, “Most of the audience 
shouts were “NATO; No, Bases Out!” And Carlos Tena, one of the presenters of the act, 
introduced the speech of Felipe González as" who soon, and that very soon, will take us 
out of NATO...”98 Critics, such as the conservative journalist Federico Jiménez Losantos, 
felt that the left used this as a political advantage to label the protest as a protest for peace 
instead of an anti-NATO protest.99 Still, the PSOE had a political platform, such as an 
anti-NATO agenda, which benefitted from the recent events that transpired from the 
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failed coup in February 1981. González wanted to take on the UCD again in the 1982 
elections. Eventually on May 30, 1982, Spain voted and became the sixteenth nation to 
join NATO.100 However, the election results in 1982 changed power from the Democratic 
Center Party to the Socialist Party and Spain changed its NATO policy once the socialists 
gained power. 
 The PSOE’s strategy during the elections was to benefit from the declining 
popularity of the UCD. In 1982, Marguerite Johnson, a journalist for Time magazine, 
wrote an article on González. She wrote, “He has supported the government on such 
issues as antiterrorist laws and regional autonomy, and proceeded to mold the party in the 
pattern of social democratic parties elsewhere in Western Europe.”101 Time’s piece 
summarized the reason for González’s success during the transition and the push for 
social democracy proved effective. González became a popular symbol of the 
reconstructed PSOE. On González’s popularity, Johnson argued,  
One reason is that Gonzalez does not sound much like a leftist. He has promised 
not to invite Communists into his government. He has little respect for 
Communist Leader Santiago Carrillo, 67, whom he calls a “bad prophet and a bad 
political leader…To reassure business leaders, Gonzalez has promised not to 
follow the example of France’s Mitterrand by nationalizing major companies, 
except for Spain’s electrical system.102 
 
González’s candidacy analyzed the past mistakes from the PSOE but the party evolved 
and took an opportunity to unite the country under the banner of the PSOE. Furthermore, 
he planned for a moderate position since his scathing critique of Marxism back in 1977. 
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González won the election defeating Calvo-Sotelo and the UCD as the main party 
of the government. The editors of El País reported that, “The left returns to power in 
Spain after more than 43 years of right wing governments, with the resounding victory of 
the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), who yesterday won with 201 seats, an 
absolute majority in the third legislative elections after the death of General Franco in 
1975…The PSOE received the votes of more than 9,800,000 Spaniards (46%)…”103 The 
success came from other factors besides the party’s change in direction. Diario 16 put 
part of González’s acceptance speech the night he won the election. He declared, “The 
Spanish Constitution...has worked correctly, facilitating the alternation in power that is 
one of the essential principles of democracy...We have a great populace. The Spanish 
people deserve all of our sacrifice.”104 González and the PSOE defended the rights of the 
Constitution and promised to improve Spain.  
NATO became one of the main reasons why the socialists won the 1982 election. 
The political scientist Angel Viñas argued that the NATO debate contributed and favored 
the Socialist Party’s victory by a landslide over the UCD and therefore the UCD 
collapsed.105 Furthermore, the PSOE benefited from the UCD’s internal problems but it 
succeeded in including Spaniards that were not from the working class. As Méndez-Lago 
concluded on the 1982 victory, the PSOE had two mission statements: “…the 
modernisation of Spain and the consolidation of democracy.”106 Furthermore, according 
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to Preston, the UCD’s defeat was the greatest electoral defeat since World War II as the 
UCD about 6 percent of the vote.107 Their defeat was embarrassing and they did not 
recover from the 1982 elections. The PSOE’s victory in 1982 signified the end of the 
transition because the PSOE transitioned with Spain in maintaining peace, freedom, and 
democracy.  
Conclusion 
 The Spanish Socialist Party was a political party that had ideological problems. 
Still, in a post-Franco world, the newer generation, led by Felipe González, knew that 
Marxism was a problematic term in Spain. The March 1979 elections was a shocking 
defeat for the socialists and the party had to make a tough decision: become moderate or 
stick to the old principles that survived during the Franco regime. The PSOE’s 28th 
Congress was a significant and historical moment for the party. The decision made by 
González to resign as Secretary General ultimately benefitted the PSOE in the future. 
Concomitantly, the UCD’s slow decline after the March 1979 elections came from a 
population that rejected some policies of consensus Adolfo Suárez and the UCD 
embraced. The turmoil with ETA and GRAPO, along with the failed coup d’état by 
Colonel Tejero and 23-F, showed the vulnerabilities of the UCD’s policy. The UCD’s 
legacy was a successful one that crashed at the end of the transition.   
 Nevertheless, the 1978 Constitution became a symbol of the start of the 
consolidation of democracy. The politics of consensus did work and favored not just the 
UCD but the other major political parties. The political rivalries after 1978 intensified as 
compromise led to closely contested elections. Furthermore, the NATO debate benefitted 
                                                          





the socialists as they were against Spain joining NATO. Overall, the Spanish transition to 
democracy concluded with the victory of González on October 28, 1982. The optimism 
towards the PSOE proved to be a strong indication that Spain shifted to a moderate leftist 
position. González remained prime minister until 1996 and the transition coincided with 
the victorious PSOE as a representation of the democratic past of the Second Republic 

































Spain’s transition to democracy was a success that rested on political consensus 
and reconciliation. Political consensus and reconciliation meant an agreement between 
politicians about how to tackle Spain’s violent past. The Spanish Civil War and the 
Franco dictatorship had an impact on Spain’s problems with unity. During the transition, 
the decisions made by the political leaders, under difficult negotiations, led to 
compromise and consolidation of a constitutional monarchy that valued liberalism, 
democracy, and decentralization. When Adolfo Suárez and the UCD (The Democratic 
Center Party) had the majority, they included regions such as Catalonia in these 
negotiations. The debates over political amnesty of political prisoners and exiles, the 
1978 Constitution, and the legalization of opposing political parties, established 
democracy in Spain since the fall of the Second Republic. Suárez and the political leaders 
of the UCD paved the way for a reconciliation between the central government in Madrid 
and regional provinces.  
Why did Spain have a political transition from an authoritarian dictatorship to 
democracy? Carlos Arias Navarro’s resignation on July 1, 1976 was the beginning of the 
peaceful transition. King Juan Carlos decided that Arias Navarro’s leadership was not the 
solution to a transition because he represented the ‘bunker’ or the loyal supporters of 
Franco. The King’s support for Suárez’s policies on political amnesty and reform 
changed the transition to a policy of reconciliation.  The political scientist Omar G. 





long term counted on the inclusion of members of the Franco regime.1 The goal of the 
moderates such as Suárez, a member of the Franco regime, and the King, the successor of 
Francoism, involved negotiations that looked forward.   
The tragic past became part of the policies of the Suárez administration. Franco’s 
death in 1975 did not solve the dilemma of the tragic past. The memory and the scars of 
the Civil War and the actions by the Franco regime did not disappear during the 
transition. However, the role of politicians such as Suárez, the King, and Felipe 
González, the Secretary General of the PSOE (the Socialist Party), during the transition 
led to some optimism that Spain could have a successful democratic state. The 
democratic right led the policies of political amnesty of political prisoners that opposed 
the Franco regime. However, the achievement of Suárez and the democratic right was the 
legalization of the PCE (the Communist Party). The democratic left supported democracy 
and continued the transition when it came to negotiations and debates over the 1978 
Constitution.  
The socialists and communists favored democracy and fair elections. The 
socialists shifted from democratic rupture to a more moderate position whereas the 
communists utilized Marxism and Eurocommunism in their party platform. 
Eurocommunism was a political ideology, coined by Santiago Carrillo and adopted by 
Western European communists, that distanced itself from the Soviet Union.2 The 
consolidation period normalized relations with the spirit of fair and competitive elections. 
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Political scientists such as Richard Gunther state that the Spanish model is a peaceful 
political transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy which is based on 
Spain’s democratic transition. The Spanish model’s praise stemmed from a negotiated 
transition from a dictatorship to a democracy. The model understood how nations would 
benefit a democratic transition after the example of Spain in the twentieth century.  
Suárez’s leadership led to the beginning of political amnesty of prisoners and 
exiles as the first step to a democratic transition. However, for a successful transition, the 
Communist Party’s inclusion in the negotiations signified the importance of ending 
animosity of Franco’s enemies. Suárez and Carrillo’s negotiations led to the legalization 
of the Communist Party in 1977. Carrillo, the Secretary General of the Communist Party, 
opposed the Franco regime and its supporters since the end of the war. The negotiation 
between Carrillo and Suárez summed up the early years of the Spanish transition because 
of the strong animosity between opposing factions. Suárez was a remnant of the Franco 
regime and Carrillo was an enemy of the state since the Civil War ended. On February 
27, 1977, Carrillo agreed to recognize the monarchy and the bicolor flag representing the 
King while Suárez agreed to the PCE’s legalization.3 
The Communist Party’s legalization had a major impact in Spanish politics. 
Suárez controversial decision to support the legalization of the PCE challenged moderate 
and ultra conservatives in Spain. For example, the military opposed the PCE’s 
legalization because of the history of the Civil War and because it viewed Carrillo and 
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the communists as dangerous. However, the military leadership was loyal to the King.4 
For the most part, the military had less influence in politics than it did under Franco. The 
King made sure that the military would remain loyal to the crown and the nation even 
with the controversies that surrounded the return of the Communist Party. The important 
parts that led to democracy in Spain did not have the military’s involvement. The coup 
d’état on February 23, 1981 furthered a mistrust of the military’s willingness to defend 
democracy and the Constitution. Still, political amnesty was a success as the democratic 
left favored democracy. Suárez’s popularity spiked with the Law of Political Reform, 
political amnesty, and the PCE’s legalization in Spanish politics. The historian Mary 
Vincent argues that the Law for Political Reform was “the constitutional groundwork for 
democracy…”5 The Law of Political Reform meant that the Suárez administration 
emphasized the importance of democratic reform. The June 15, 1977 elections resulted in 
Suárez and the UCD’s victory but it was a success because of the PSOE and PCE’s 
involvement. The elections proved that Spain made progress in the democratic transition.   
The 1978 Constitution represented the politics of consensus.6 The Constitution 
was inclusive to parts of the country that wanted regional autonomy from the central 
government in Madrid. Stanley Payne argues that, except for the Basques, national 
consensus included peaceful dialogue, reconciliation, and negotiation instead of 
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confrontations.7 The Moncloa Pacts and the drafting of the 1978 Constitution included 
members of the UCD, PSOE, PCE, the Catalonians, and the conservative party AP 
(People’s Alliance). The constitutional debates provided speeches from key political 
leaders of each major party’s thoughts on a constitution. The results from these debates 
were a Constitutional Monarchy with regional autonomous provinces, self-rule, and basic 
freedoms of a democratic nation.  
The political and cultural issues such as language, laws, regional autonomy, and 
Spanish nationalism summed up the decentralization of the Spanish state. The 
Constitution provided a bicameral Cortes (the Spanish parliament) that included a Senate 
and Congress of Deputies. Decentralization challenged the Franco regime of Spanish 
nationalism centralized in Madrid. The new Spanish state collaborated with all political 
leaders of various regions. The political scientists Richard Gunther, José Ramón 
Montero, and Joan Botella state that after the 1978 Constitution, Spain became “Estado 
de las autonamías” (State of the Autonomies).8 The changes made to the Spanish state 
provided more freedoms for autonomous regions. The Basques and the PNV (The Basque 
Nationalist Party) caused some problems with the transition since ETA still carried out 
terrorist attacks after Franco’s death. 
However, without the main political parties, such as the PSOE and the UCD, the 
1978 Constitution would have failed. The debates over the Constitution showcased the 
changes since Arias Navarro’s resignation. The ratification on December 6, 1978 proved 
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that the Constitution was popular as an overwhelming majority voted yes. These political 
actions by Suárez and the UCD displayed stability and wisdom to Spaniards. The 
Constitution’s ratification led to the UCD’s victory in the March 1979 elections. The 
election verified that Spaniards approved Suárez’s policies since he became the King’s 
choice to lead the transition. The Spanish conservatives respected the monarchy and 
Suárez won elections due to support from the King and his stances on social conservative 
values. 
The Socialist Party’s contributions to the transition played a significant role in 
these negotiated pacts. The PSOE’s original party platform was Marxism and democratic 
rupture. Democratic rupture declared the removal of remnants of Francoism from the 
government that included the ‘bunker’ or the dedicated supporters of Franco. González 
and the Vice-Secretary General Alfonso Guerra, led the change in the PSOE’s change in 
policy. González, Guerra, and their supporters within the PSOE, argued that the party’s 
slogan and its ideology should not use Marxism. For González, the success of Suárez and 
his policies on amnesty, free elections, the Communist Party’s legalization, and the 
election results of being in second place behind the UCD, led to his decision that the 
PSOE needed to become more moderate. Suárez’s social conservative policies also 
worked against the PSOE, such as Suárez’s refusal to decriminalize abortion, because 
some Spaniards had concerns over socialism and some were still Catholics. González’s 
decision proved to be right about the PSOE’s shortcomings in winning elections as he 
and his supporters knew that most Spaniards favored moderate positions. The PSOE’s 
28th Party Congress in 1979 became a debate on Marxism and while it caused González 





Exceptional Conference on September 1979. The goal of the PSOE, as with all the major 
parties, was to win the majority. González also believed in political consensus and 
reconciliation once the socialists changed strategies.  
The Socialist Party’s victory in 1982 changed Spain because the socialists 
controlled the majority even after the violence and repression of the Franco regime. 
González’s victory proved how Spain had changed in seven years from 1975 to 1982. 
The socialists challenged the UCD but they understood the importance of reform and 
unity. The socialists left leaning moderate position, based on working class and union 
rights but not a radical push for revolution and nationalizing business, resulted from the 
debates within the party but also with their opponents. González’s administration lasted 
until 1996 and his decision to criticize and let go of Marxism led to the PSOE’s victory. 
The democratic transitional period’s international significance was unlike the 
international context of the Spanish Civil War. Still, the U.S. and the world understood 
how significant the death of Franco affected Western Europe and the creation and 
ratification of the 1978 Constitution. For example, the U.S. Embassy reports revealed that 
the military opposed the possibility the Spanish government legalizing the Spanish 
Communist Party. Analysis of the transition in an international context is important 
because of the comparisons made to Spain’s transition to other authoritarian dictatorships 
transitioning to democracy in the twentieth century such as Portugal. Spanish newspaper 
publications played a significant role in the transition thanks to an increase push for the 
freedom of the press. El País and Cambio 16 had significant reports on the events since 





in the PSOE’s platform that led to their victory in 1982. These newspaper reports include 
transcripts of speeches from important politicians such as Suárez and González. 
The failed coup on February 23, 1981 and the terrorist attacks from ETA, 
GRAPO, and left and right wing groups challenged the transition to democracy. These 
incidents influenced the policies of the major parties. The coup was the last-ditch effort 
for the Francoists to the return of an authoritarian regime. The actions by King Juan 
Carlos prevented a disaster in Madrid. However, the threat of a military uprising led to 
the decline of the UCD and the rise of the PSOE. The socialists figured that the failed 
coup was a moment that proved that the remnants of the Franco regime still challenged 
the democratic ideals of the 1978 Constitution. For example, González led the socialists 
to a more moderate position that emphasized more on the working class but not on 
nationalizing private industry and Marxism as a dogma. This action proved vital for the 
success of the PSOE in elections after 1979. The Marxism debate during the 28th Party 
Congress of the PSOE was a microcosm of the politics of the transition. The divisions of 
the Spanish political leaders had a key role in the elections, especially after the 
ratification of the 1978 Constitution. The NATO debate also had a significant role in 
1982 because of the anti-NATO sentiment from the constituents of the Socialist Party. 
The socialists and communist parties were against Spain entering NATO and that assisted 
the PSOE in the 1982 elections. 
González and his party members won the 1982 elections with the lessons learned 
from the past. The Second Republic’s demise by Franco and the Nationalist forces 
brought forth valuable lessons. Democracy in Spain had failed experiments but the 





Moreover, the PSOE understood that some Spaniards still believed in the old myths and 
narratives by Francoists against the left. Julián Casanova’s article, “History and Memory: 
A New Social Dimension,” analyzed the importance of historians that challenged the 
outdated and discredited narratives and myths of the Nationalists and supporters of 
Franco.9 The collective memory of the past, while not a product of the pacto de olvido 
(pact of forgetting), the democratic transition needed to avoid these controversies. The 
socialists, and other political parties, needed to ensure that the 1978 Constitution needed 
to prevent another 1936.  
The Spanish transition to democracy succeeded in the establishment of 
democratic institutions. Political scientists and historians such as Paul Preston, Santos 
Juliá, Paloma Aguilar, Richard Gunther, Michael Mann, Michael Richards, and others 
have studied this period since Franco’s death. However, the 1978 Constitution’s debates 
were significant because not only did it have major party leaders but the points raised by 
these leaders addressed the issues of drafting the 1978 Constitution. The Constitution 
responded to the mistakes made from the 1930s. Still, historians of Modern Spain should 
continue to analyze Suárez and González’s leadership in the construction of a democratic 
state.  
 When the PSOE won the elections in 1982, the democratic transition ended. The 
UCD no longer exists in contemporary Spanish politics but scholars have not and should 
not underestimate Suárez’s impact in Spanish history. The decisions made by Suárez, 
sometimes controversial, proved that Spain could function as a democratic state even 
after nearly forty years of the Franco regime and its crimes. Spaniards embraced 
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democracy and they supported the monarchy and the Constitution. Furthermore, they 
were against Colonel Antonio Tejero and 23-F’s attempted coup to take over the Spanish 
parliament as reported by newspapers and magazines. The decisions made by the political 
leaders modernized Spain and put the nation into an international context. Spain’s 
transition to democracy was a negotiated pact that bridged the Franco era with a 
consolidated Spanish democracy. The moderate politicians of the left and the right 
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